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ABSTRACT
THE CORPORATE VENTURE DYAD: A STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF CULTURAL
DISTANCE ON VENTURE PERFORMANCE
Tommie R. Welcher
October 15, 2020
Even though corporate ventures (CVs) provide many benefits to established
corporations, they continue to fail at a high rate. Whereas research supports that a
corporation can gain a parenting advantage over its competitors (Campbell et al., 1995),
there is no evidence to support that starting more CVs leads to more successful CVs.
Parenting advantage theory postulates that if a corporation with a parenting advantage
starts a venture then that venture will be more successful than if any of their competitors
had started the same venture (Campbell et al., 1995). CVs are typified by dynamism and
innovation, but established corporations have a duty to maximize shareholder returns
while minimizing risks (Simon et al., 1999). The divergence of these two cultures can
create cultural friction at the interface of the interacting corporate and venture managers.
I analyzed these relationships to understand what impact cultural distance could have on
CV performance. I found that an increase in corporate cultural distance is associated
with a decrease in venture success. My findings suggest that even though a corporation
may possess resources that could benefit its venture, that cultural distance between a
parent and its venture could be inhibiting the transfer of these resources to its venture
leading to lower levels of venture success.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Corporate Ventures are a form of entrepreneurship in which a corporation creates
or acquires a wholly-owned new business and then allows it to operate independently of
its parent (Kuratko et al. 2015). Corporate ventures (CVs) are an attractive option for
established firms desiring to grow or diversify (Garrett & Neubaum, 2013). Research
shows that CVs have evolved over the past 40 years beyond their early role of developing
value-creating innovations (Schollhammer, 1982). Other scholars have proposed CVs are
now being utilized as vehicles through which corporations can gain knowledge (McGrath
et al., 1994), achieve international success (Birkinshaw, 1997), and learn to configure
resources innovatively to develop a competitive advantage (Kuratko et al., 2009).
Scholars show that established corporations have three primary goals when starting CVs:
1) to increase the innovative capability of a firm; 2) to realize greater value from a
parent’s existing skills and resources by cultivating new knowledge in areas of strategic
importance; and 3) to quickly generate financial returns (Miles & Covin, 2002).
An underdeveloped but promising theory explaining the success some
corporations can cultivate in corporate ventures is the parenting advantage. The
parenting advantage is the amount of success that a CV achieves because of the
particular corporate parent, it has and the amount of support it receives from that parent
corporation (Campbell et al., 1995). This theory goes on to state that if a corporation has
a parenting advantage its ventures will perform better than it would if it had a different
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corporate parent (Campbell et al., 1995). Thus, a parent corporation that can provide its
ventures with more support and create more successful ventures has a parenting
advantage over its competitors (Campbell et al., 1995). Further development of the
theory has found that a corporation can obtain the parenting advantage in multiple ways;
by providing complementary skills that a CV may not possess (Campbell et al., 1995), by
providing market-specific expertise due to market relatedness of a venture (Garrett &
Covin, 2015), by providing specific resources to the endowment of a venture (Garrett &
Neubaum, 2013), or by providing specific knowledge that can benefit a venture
(Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005). Although this theoretical lens provides valuable
insights into how a corporation can create successful CVs by providing them with
support, it fails to consider the impact relationship factors between a CV and corporate
parent may have on the corporation’s transfer of support and eventual venture success.
We know that a parent corporation can obtain the parenting advantage and be
more successful with its corporate ventures than its competitors by providing
complementary skills and resources that a venture may not possess (Campbell et al.,
1995). However, this theory currently hasn’t been developed beyond this point, and we
do not yet understand how the relationship between a parent and a venture can impact the
transfer of beneficial resources from parent to venture. There could be characteristics of
the relationship that inhibit the ability of a parent corporation to transfer the level of
needed support to a venture. The theory to this point provides that a venture provides a
parenting opportunity if a business can be improved beyond its current state (Campbell et
al., 1995). We also know that a corporation can realize this opportunity if it possesses
skills or resources that can improve the business (Campbell et al., 1995). An important
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assumption of the theory is that if a corporation has the complementary resources and a
parenting advantage exists with a venture, it will transfer the beneficial resources and
realize the parenting advantage. This assumption ignores the possibility that a parenting
opportunity exists but that a corporation possessing beneficial resources is unable to
transfer them to a venture. Expanding the theory to include how aspects of the
relationship between two companies can inhibit the transfer of resources will further
develop the theory.
A more holistic understanding of what factors can inhibit a corporation from
transferring the parenting advantage to its ventures will allow us not only to understand
why some corporations are more successful at venturing activities than others, but also
why some ventures of a particular parent are more successful than their sibling ventures.
Beyond the development of theory, there is a very practical reason to increase our
understanding of how and why CVs fail or succeed. Corporations are engaging in
venturing activities with purpose, and whereas, research supports venturing being a
popular activity for corporations trying to grow, CVs continue to have very high failure
rates (Hanan, 1976; Garrett & Neubaum, 2013). A more developed understanding of
why and how CVs fail or succeed can provide coachable insights to help corporations
more successfully start new ventures.
To bridge this gap in theory and increase our understanding of what leads to
venture success, I am adding the concept of cultural distance to the theoretical lens of
parenting advantage. This motivates my primary research question which is:
Research Question 1: What is the impact of cultural distance on the
performance of a CV?
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Varying levels of cultural distance between the parent corporation and its venture
could be an aspect of the relationship that is impacting the ability of a parent corporation
to transfer support to a venture. Culture is a set of important assumptions that members
of a group share (Sathe, 1985). Research indicates that every corporate culture is unique
and that it impacts its members (Schein, 1985). Cultural distance is the extent to which
different cultures are similar or different (Shenkar, 2001). Corporate cultural distance is
the amount of difference between two or more unique corporate cultures (Shenkar, 2001).
In the management literature, cultural distance is shown to be a key antecedent of
performance in relationships between culturally diverse corporations (Shenkar, 2001),
including the performance of affiliated businesses (Black & Mendenhall, 1991). For
example, mergers and international joint ventures are like CVs in that they require
multiple and diverse management teams to work together. These popular modes of
exploiting new markets are shown to have failure rates as high as 70% (Christensen et al.,
2011; Lowen & Pope, 2008). Research into the area has found that cultural distance
significantly impacts the success that corporations engaging in these activities will
achieve (Shenkar, 2001).
The need to learn through experimentation creates a CV culture wherein mistakes
are tolerable so long as employees are learning from them (Simon et al., 1999). This
willingness of a CV to learn through experimentation is in stark contrast to the stodgier
character and bureaucratic policies typically associated with many large, established
corporations (Simon et al., 1999). Large corporations traditionally have a rigid hierarchy,
which impedes the nimbleness needed to make quick, flexible decisions (Simon et al.,
1999). CVs require a unique culture from a parent corporation which the venture
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manager is responsible for developing (Shrader & Simon, 1997; Simon et al., 1999). As
an innovative firm, a CV’s need for flexibility will create cultural distance from a parent
that could create cultural friction.
Cultural friction is the amount of increase in resistance or animosity that can
occur at the interface between interacting culturally different companies, which could
increase the difficulty of communication, interaction, and information exchange
(Shenkar, 2001, Luo & Shenkar, 2011). This increase in the difficulty of interaction
could worsen the relationship between the parties, as well as reduce the amount of
information exchanged. Research to this point has not considered what impact cultural
distance between an established corporation and its CV has on CV performance.
However, the relationship between the two management teams impacts the potential
benefits, if any, which will be transferred between an established corporation and its CV
(Covin et al., 2016). In this sense, an important consideration is that before such a
relationship can flourish, and both parties benefit, they must be able to interact
harmoniously. To this point, we don’t know what impact cultural distance from a parent
corporation has on the success of a corporate venture.
I focus on the corporate cultural distance between an established corporation and
its newly formed CV. When considering the impact of cultural distance, I consider that a
culturally different CV may result in cultural friction occurring between the parent and its
CV. I consider if this increase in cultural friction can act to inhibit the transfer of
beneficial resources that a venture can receive from its parent and alter the amount of
success the venture ultimately finds.
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Research shows that when a corporate parent creates a CV it is important to
balance the autonomy of a CV with the amount of monitoring used to restrict a venture’s
options (Simon et al., 1999; Garrett & Covin, 2015). When lack of balance is considered
in conjunction with starting more CVs over time, especially when their performance is
disappointing (Kuratko et al.,2009), it becomes increasingly apparent that a parent has an
internal shortcoming leading to failure, perhaps serially, at corporate venturing activities.
The cultural distance between a CV and its parent corporation, as well as the friction it
creates, could lead to a lack of beneficial resources being transferred from the parent
corporation and/or received by the venture. The additional strain of this could eventually
lead to a dysfunctional relationship. I consider the impact of the congruence of
perceptions and culture on the success of a CV. The theoretical lens that captures the
importance of beneficial resource exchange between a parent corporation and its ventures
is the parenting advantage perspective. The ability of a firm to overcome a strained
relationship and receive the resources from a parent corporation is incorporated within
the constructs of absorptive capacity and turbulence. This dissertation considers the
relationship between cultural distance and performance as moderated by absorptive
capacity and turbulence.
The Impact of Absorptive Capacity on the Relationship Between Cultural
Distance and the Performance of a CV
Absorptive Capacity is the corporate capacity to utilize external knowledge during
the successive learning processes; 1.) exploration, 2.) transformation, and 3.) exploitation
(Lane et al., 2006; Lichtenthaler, 2009). Research shows that absorptive capacity is the
aggregation of this learning process through which a corporation derives its ability to
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obtain, assimilate, and stockpile knowledge (Lane et al., 2006). In the relationship
between the CV and parent corporation, having cultural distance may provide an
opportunity for the venture to learn from their parent (March, 1991) while altering their
culture to include new processes and structures (Kuratko & Audretsch, 2013). The level
to which the venture management team can acquire and incorporate information from the
parent could impact the extent to which its venture is able to benefit from the parenting
advantage the parent corporation has to offer. Research into the area suggests that the
amount of information exchanged is positively correlated with better firm performance
(Kuratko et al., 2009).
The Impact of Turbulence on the Relationship Between Cultural Distance and
the Performance of a CV
Turbulence is the combination of; 1.) the extent to which the composition and
preferences of a corporation’s customers change over time, 2.) the behavior, resources,
ability of competitors to differentiate; as well as 3.) the extent to which technology in an
industry is in a state of flux (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993). Research shows that during times
of high environmental turbulence, corporations are more likely to seek out innovative
opportunities (Kuratko et al., 2014b). The level of turbulence could impact the extent to
which venture managers are open to and/or actively seek out the opportunity to gain
information from their corporate parent. These varying levels of turbulence could lead to
a change in feeling the “need” to learn and change by upper management. A change in
felt-need by management to gain and disseminate new knowledge may alter the amount
of change through nurturing a parent makes on the processes and structures of a venture.
Whereas, learning occurs at the individual level, for the learning to change processes and
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structures, which are engrained in culture, the learning has to pass from management
through the corporation (March, 1991). Under pressure for a venture to perform and with
the added stress of environmental turbulence, managers may be more aggressive in trying
to gain new knowledge and more proactive in distributing this learned knowledge
through the ranks of a venture.
The Impact of Perceived Cultural Distance Congruence on the Relationship
Between Cultural Distance and CV Performance
The unique perceptions of a manager impact his or her views of success (Bantel,
1998), and the strain created by cultural distance is shown to be a key contributor to
success (Shenkar, 2001). In the instance of a CV, this strain can occur due a lack of
congruence between a CV manager and the manager of the parent corporation. A strain
between the nuanced aspects of personal relationships between a parent corporation and a
CV can lead to difficulties in nurturing a CV (Sherman, 1992). Congruence of
perceptions of cultural distance between the managers of a parent corporation and a CV,
independent of the amount of cultural distance, could alter the way the two sides
communicate and interact with each other.
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Research Model

Intended Contributions
The primary intended contribution of this dissertation is to further develop the
perspective of parenting advantage. Although it shows parenting is a way corporations
can more successfully start ventures by nurturing these ventures and providing their
venture offspring with complementary resources and skills (Campbell et al., 1995), it has
not been developed extensively past this point. A goal of this research is to develop the
parenting advantage perspective beyond its current considerations. In this research, I
attempt to extend the perspective past thinking in terms of solely whether a corporation is
a good or bad parent or does that corporation have complementary resources with which
to properly nurture its ventures. This research considers what seems a more likely option
that all corporate parents have some amount of complementary resources or advantages
9

they can offer to their ventures, but there is some aspect of the relationship between the
parent and child that is inhibiting this nurturing from being transferred from the parent to
child. I do this by considering the impact of cultural distance between a parent and its
venture which has been correlated with negative child outcomes between culturally
distant human parents and their children (Kim et al., 2006; Tseng & Fuligni, 2000).
Although the body of CV research has provided many insights, scholars continue
to cite the same problem of high failure rates with CVs (Hanan, 1976; Lowen & Pope,
2008). The relationship between corporate and venture managers is essential to the
success of a CV (Sherman, 1992). However, studying this relationship has proved to be
difficult. A goal of this research is to better understand the relationship between the two
managers and what impact cultural distance has on this relationship. By understanding
the impact of cultural distance, I hope to determine to what extent an increase in cultural
distance and friction has on the amount of success a venture can have. If the reason a
venture is unable to receive the optimum level of nurturing from its parent corporation is
friction inhibiting the transfer process, it is coachable and a problem that can be
overcome.
A better understanding of this relationship will make both theoretical and
practical contributions. This research focuses on the relationship and/or relational strain
between corporate and venture managers, which is an aspect of venturing activities that
managers can be coached on and improve. Advancing the understanding of how cultural
distance can impact the relationship between a parent and CV managers and eventually
on venture success will provide an opportunity to improve CV success rates. The
relationship between the two managers is paramount in the success yet the intricacies that
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lead to the success or failure of the relationships are not well understood. The practical
contribution is that a better understanding of this relationship will allow us as scholars
and educators to make more cogent recommendations to current and future executives
that will be charged with the success of future CVs. The ultimate goal is that this
research can lead to decreasing the failure rate of future CVs.
This study will make contributions to corporate managers. Research indicates
that there is no link between the number of CVs a corporation previously started and the
success they achieve through each CV (Kuratko et al., 2009). This could imply that there
are inherent characteristics of corporations that greatly impact their likelihood of
launching successful CVs. These characteristics and their nuances may be captured in
corporate culture. By providing managers with a better understanding of the impact of
cultural distance as well as the congruence of distance perceptions between parent and
CV managers, I can provide a basis for enacting change on parent corporation-CV
relations. Learning can come from someone outside the current corporate culture
(March, 1991), and learning is shown to impact the level of success a CV obtains (Covin
et al., 2016). Also, learning by the parent corporation is a measure of the success of a CV
(Keil et al., 2009). Through increasing corporate managers’ understanding of the roles
cultural distance and absorptive capacity have on performance, we may be able to foster
an environment of understanding and increased information exchange between parent
corporations and CVs.
Cultural distance is one of the most considered constructs in international
business research (Shenkar, 2012). Despite CVs being used as vehicles through which
corporations can achieve international success (Birkinshaw, 1997; Callaway, 2008), and
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the widely accepted fact that large corporations and their CVs have different corporate
cultures (Simon et al., 1999; Garrett & Covin, 2015), it has yet to be included in the CV
literature. This study uses multiple measurement methods to determine the cultural
distance between parent corporations and their CVs and the impact that this distance has
on CV performance. By including international data, I hope to further increase the
generalizability of this study.
A common complaint within the CV literature is that there is a failure to use
multiple sources of data and limited alignment with major theoretical streams (Ireland &
Webb, 2007; Hill & Georgoulas, 2016). This study will contribute to overcoming this
challenge in multiple ways. First, this study aligns with major theoretical streams by
including variables of cultural distance and absorptive capacity. Absorptive capacity is a
construct of interest when considering a relationship between two culturally diverse
corporations (Bjorkman et al., 2007). The relationship between a CV and parent
corporation is a complex relationship between two culturally diverse companies, yet the
impact of absorptive capacity on the performance of CVs has not been heavily explored.
This study will advance the current literature through both improving our understanding
of the relationship between absorptive capacity and performance, and also how
absorptive capacity moderates the relationship between cultural distance and CV
performance.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Literature Review
In this chapter, I provide a review of the pertinent literature and later develop the
hypotheses of this study. I organize the literature review into four subsections: the
foundation of CV research, learning and CVs, internationalization and CVs, and the
antecedents of CV success. The foundations of CV research include some of the earliest
and most influential work into corporate venturing. Because the scope of this project is
international, I review the literature of CVs being used to enter international markets.
Also, I introduce in this study cultural components and cultural distance as antecedents to
CV success. I review the antecedents other scholars have proposed and studied as
predictors of CV performance.
Foundation of CV Research
Corporations, in part, use CVs as a way to diversify (Schollhammer, 1982).
Acquisitions have long been thought to be a good option for diversification
(Schollhammer, 1982). However, high failure rates and complications with antitrust laws
led corporations to explore other means to diversify (Adams, 1969; Hanan, 1976). Early
CVs also had unsatisfactory results, with many of the early movers having nothing to
show for their efforts and then canceling all their venturing activities (Hanan, 1976). It
was also found that CVs were subject to early termination even though studies showed a
CV on average required eight years to prove its worth (Burgerdike, 1979). From
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interviews with corporate managers, researchers ascertained that part of this problem was
due to CVs being treated like smaller multinational firms with the same departments and
resource allocation structure (Hanan, 1976). Researchers have determined that major
corporations are not natural habitats for entrepreneurial activities and that CVs need to be
treated more like start-ups than smaller clones of major corporations (Hanan, 1976). The
bureaucratic conditions that exist in many large corporations create a hostile environment
for innovation (Hlavecek & Thompson, 1978). Major corporations operate under a very
rigid business plan, which works well for established businesses, but CVs need room to
be flexible and adapt to the environment to be able to succeed (Hanan, 1976, Honig &
Karlsson, 2004). CVs were found to need a different style of manager, organization, and
objective structure than its large parent corporation (Hanan, 1976). The conclusion that a
CV needs a different type of manager formed the basis of modern CV research. While a
CV can be useful for a large corporation, it can also be difficult to implement. The
difficulty of implementing a CV is due in part to the CV needing to be so different from
the parent corporation yet still overseen by a parent who may not fully understand a CV’s
needs (Fast, 1979; Garrett & Neubaum, 2013).
Further research suggested that the involvement of parent corporation
management could have a significant impact on the success that a CV ultimately achieves
(MacMillan & George, 1985). Earlier research had indicated that a primary cause of
failure with CVs was the frequent interference of parent corporation managers
(Burgelman, 1983). While later research concurred that interference could increase
failure rates of CVs, studies also found that total neglect had similarly negative results
(MacMillan & George, 1985). It was determined that parent corporation management
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faced the difficult challenge of balancing the amount of management and oversight they
provided to the CV (MacMillan & George, 1985). Researchers also determined that
parent corporations needed to understand the amount of support a CV would need in
order to have an opportunity to succeed (MacMillan & George, 1985).
Learning and CVs
Although the majority of CV research has focused on business growth and
financial performance, it has been suggested that a primary role of a CV is to provide a
vehicle through which an existing corporation can generate new abilities and knowledge
(Keil et al., 2009). Further research from Keil et al. (2009) suggested that failure is part
of the natural lifecycle of ventures and that the benefits corporations can garnish from
CVs are not correlated with the CV’s market success. This research focuses on the
learning that occurs at the level of the parent corporation. Other scholars have focused on
how learning impacts the survivability of a CV (Gupta et al., 2006; Hill & Birkinshaw,
2014). The learning process is not simple; it involves many nuances and complexities. A
CV may be engaging in learning activities to develop its own new market knowledge
(Gupta et al., 2006). This knowledge can then be assimilated and utilized through the
learning activities of the parent corporation (Gupta et al., 2006). Learning is not
inherently a trait of a corporation, but rather a function of individuals. Within a CV it
may be necessary to have different types of people or skills to obtain the proper level of
balance among learning activities (Gupta et al., 2006).
Recent research has extended this work into learning by considering the extent to
which ambidexterity between learning activities leads to the ability of a CV to endure
(Hill & Birkinshaw, 2014). Whereas the primary responsibility of a CV may be to
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provide new opportunities for the parent corporation, the CV is also responsible for
utilizing the existing resources of the parent corporation to make advancements more
effectively (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2014). Also, a CV should find ways to exploit its
investments to benefit the parent firm (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2014). This research also
found that the survivability of a CV was reliant on multiple antecedents, including the
ability of the CV to use the parent corporation’s existing capabilities to develop new
capabilities and the extent to which the CV could integrate its activities with other units
within the corporation (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2014). The ability of a CV to coordinate its
activities with the activities of both a parent corporation and other CVs greatly increases
the likelihood that a CV endures and has an ongoing role with its parent corporation (Hill
& Birkinshaw, 2014). The irony is, that although CVs are often seen as a way for parent
corporations to improve their ambidexterity, it may very well be balanced ambidexterity
that leads to the survivability of CVs (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2014).
CVs as a way to Enter International Markets
Multinational enterprises often desire to spread their costs over large customer
bases (Hitt et al., 2006). This desire can drive multinationals to take current product
offerings and expand them into new markets. One method of entering new markets is for
corporations to establish global ventures, which are CVs started specifically to enter a
new international market (Callaway, 2008). Although corporations may prefer to enter
international markets slowly, global competition can necessitate that they enter more
quickly. More often firms are pressured to expand their markets internationally early in
their history to remain competitive (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994). CVs require a
different culture from their parent corporations. Similarly, companies entering a new
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international market may require a different culture to succeed than the parent
corporation. The usage of CVs to enter new international markets may provide
established corporations a vehicle through which to access these markets which is more
adaptable than the established corporation (Callaway, 2008). Likewise, a CV has the
advantage of the parent corporation’s established resources to help facilitate its entry into
the new market (Callaway, 2008).
Antecedents of Success
Research into CVs has identified several antecedents and correlates indicating the
success of a CV. Uncommitted financial resources and opportunities within a parent
corporation’s core business are associated with more successful CVs (Kuratko et al.,
2009). Research stipulates that when opportunities lay within the purview of a parent
corporation’s core businesses the parent was less likely to engage in counterproductive
meddling which helped the CV to be more successful (Kuratko et al., 2009). Operating
within a market or product that is adjacent to that of the parent corporation has long been
regarded as an antecedent to CV success (Thornhill & Amit, 2001; Hill & Birkinshaw,
2008). However, empirical research has found very little support that product similarity
and market familiarity are associated with the survivability of a CV (Kuratko et al.,
2009). The degree to which a CV was a planned strategic initiative was shown to
positively impact the success of a CV (Kuratko et al., 2009). It was stipulated that this
could be due to a parent corporation viewing a strategically planned CV as more
legitimate and more adequately providing the necessary funding for such ventures
(Kuratko et al., 2009).
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The literature to this point has continued to support that the degree to which the
CV has the support of the top management of its parent corporation is a key factor in CV
success (Shrader & Simon, 1997; Kuratko et al., 2005; Kuratko et al., 2009). The natural
turnover of upper-level management and the lifecycles of a new investment venture can
unfortunately often lead to a lack of needed support. Research has found that the average
cycle of change for a corporation’s CEO is six years (Kaplan & Minton, 2006) and that
the average start-up investment will not show a positive yield until year seven or eight
(Gompers & Lerner, 1998, 2001). Clear communication of the goals and value
propositions for a CV from parent company managers to CV managers has a high
correlation with venture performance (Kuratko et al., 2009; Covin et al. 2016).
Early research into the topic determined there was a strong correlation between
CV performance and operational relatedness with a parent corporation (Sorrentino &
Williams, 1995). Since then, empirical work on the topic has found that CV
organizational autonomy from the parent corporation is correlated with better CV
financial performance (Hill et al., 2009; Kuratko et al., 2009). It has been found that
higher levels of venture specific knowledge by parent corporation management and
general managerial skills are positively correlated with better CV performance (Kuratko
et al., 2009; Riley et al., 2009). Unsurprisingly, both the parent corporation possessing
the strategic resources necessary for success in the CV’s business and providing the CV
with a sufficient initial endowment of these strategic resources has been correlated with
better CV performance (Kuratko et al., 2009). To this point, research has found a
negative impact of both environmental hostility and dynamism on the performance of a
CV (Covin et al., 2016).

18

Parenting Advantage
The parenting advantage was developed as a method for corporations to decide
the fit of a potential new venture for them by evaluating if they have a parenting
advantage with that business (Campbell et al., 1995). The theory states that if a
corporation has a parenting advantage over its competitors then they will create more
value for a particular venture than if any of their competitors created the same venture
(Campbell et al., 1995). For a parent corporation to have a parenting advantage the
venture has to provide them with a parenting opportunity, signifying that there is room
for the venture to be improved (Campbell et al., 1995). The parent corporation is then
able to gain a parenting advantage if a parenting opportunity exists and they have
complementary resources or skills with which they can share with the venture to improve
it (Campbell et al., 1995). This research has been extended over the past several years.
The parenting advantage has been applied to the parent corporation providing
complementary assets to a firm enabling the increase in technological developments
(King et al., 2003). Beyond just having complementary skills and resources to provide to
a venture, research has also found that a corporate parent can achieve a parenting
advantage through the initial strategic asset endowment that they provide to the venture
(Garrett & Neubaum, 2013). The amount of parenting advantage a parent corporation
has was also argued to be impacted by the amount of embeddedness that the venture and
corporate parent share in the same network (Nell & Ambos, 2013).
Development of Hypotheses
Corporate Cultural Distance
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The parenting advantage has become a popular perspective to explain the success
that a corporation has creating new ventures (Campbell et al., 1995; Nippa et al., 2011).
The perspective of parenting advantage states that a venture can receive nurturing from a
parent corporation (Campbell et al., 1995). Some parent corporations have a parenting
advantage, whereby the best parent corporations will create more value for a venture than
if any of their rivals owned the same business (Campbell et al., 1995). This perspective
includes the corporation providing complementary services or resources to a venture that
the venture may not possess (Campbell et al., 1995). However, there is more to parenting
than just having resources that can benefit your offspring. Equally important is that you
be able to transfer these resources that you have to your offspring for them to receive the
benefit of having a good parent.
Further research into corporate venturing shows that there is no correlation
between a corporation starting more ventures and a corporation starting more successful
ventures (Kuratko et al., 2009). This, in conjunction with the parenting advantage
perspective, can be interpreted in multiple ways. I have interpreted the work of Kuratko
et al. (2009) that venturing is difficult, and each individual venture presents a unique
corporation-CV culture dyad. For this reason, it is difficult to learn from one venture and
apply that learning to future ventures. My interpretation, from these two streams, is that
most if not all corporations have some knowledge or resources to offer their ventures.
However, in some parent venture relationships, something is inhibiting the parent from
transferring their advantage to their offspring. Cultural distance between a parent
corporation and their venture could be one factor that is impacting the ability of a parent
corporation to transfer the resources they have to their ventures. Cultural distance has
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been shown to create cultural friction between two culturally different interacting parties
(Shenkar, 2001). A corporation starting a new CV is acting both as a parent and a
business having interactions with a culturally different business. Cultural distance is
shown in business research to impact the success of the relationship between two
culturally different businesses (Shenkar, 2001). Also, social research into the parenting
paradigm in humans shows that cultural distance between a parent and child is correlated
with negative child outcomes (Kim et al., 2006; Tseng & Fuligni, 2000).
CVs are a popular option for established corporations to exploit a myriad of
potential opportunities (Garrett & Neubaum, 2013). The necessity of a CV to be
innovative and learn through failure sets the culture of a CV apart from that of an
established corporation. The typical established corporate cultural structure, including
well-defined boundaries and rigid hierarchies, is not conducive to entrepreneurial efforts
(Dess et al., 1999). In stark contrast to this, firms that are entrepreneurial tend to exhibit
characteristics of dynamism and flexibility and are prepared to capitalize on new
opportunities when they arise (Kuratko et al. 2012). For this reason, even though
innovation and entrepreneurship are viewed as necessary strategies for firms competing
in today’s marketplace, successful execution of CVs remains difficult for most
corporations (Kuratko et al., 2014a). CVs create a situation where the established
corporation must delicately balance the entrepreneurial initiative’s need for independence
with the corporation’s need to manage and mitigate costs and risks (Garrett & Covin,
2014). The stark contrast in corporate cultures that exist between established
corporations and their entrepreneurial CVs necessitates the understanding of the impact
cultural distance has on this delicate relationship.
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The need for a CV management team to tolerate failure in the name of learning
and innovation is very much a different way of approaching business than that associated
with established corporations. The disparity between these two cultures is likely to create
a level of friction between the two management teams. This friction caused by different
cultures could deteriorate and strain the relationship between the parent and CV. A
strained relationship could prove problematic as research has found that CVs need parent
support to succeed (Kuratko et al., 2009), and that parent corporations can gain novel
information from their CVs (Keil et al., 2009). If the distance between the two corporate
cultures is reducing the amount of information and resources that are being transmitted
between a CV and parent corporation, then the distance will in turn create a situation
where a CV performs poorly. This poor performance would manifest both in terms of its
own lower financial returns and survivability.
A common problem with cultural distance research is that cultural distance is
measured from a single common culture to multiple different cultures (Brouthers et al.,
2016). In the case of considering CVs, this would be equivalent to measuring only from
the established corporations to the multiple cultures of its CVs. This strategy ignores the
perceived cultural distances from a CV to the established corporation. This is
problematic because it assumes symmetry when considering the measure of cultural
distance. Distance by definition is symmetric, and the assumption is that the distance
from culture A to culture B is the same as the distance from culture B to culture A
(Shenkar, 2001). However, there are no studies showing this symmetry exists when
considering cultural distance and there is no reason to assume that this symmetry exists
(Shenkar, 2001). This assumption of symmetry would imply that the distance from an
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established corporation to a CV is the same as the distance from a CV to a corporation.
This could be untrue in part because culture includes many nuances and is subject to the
perceptions of both the corporate and joint venture managers. To address the concern of
asymmetry in cultural distance I propose hypotheses considering cultural distance from
the perspective of both the corporate and venture manager, as well as a calculated
measure of cultural distance which will assume symmetry in cultural distance. To
calculate the measure of cultural distance I will collect the corporate and CV manager’s
perceptions of the culture for their own company and then calculate the absolute distance
between the two cultures.

H1a.

Corporate Manager’s
Perceived Cultural

CV
Performance

Distance

CV Manager’s
Perceived Cultural

CV
H1b.

Performance

Distance

CV

Measured Cultural
Distance

H1c.
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Performance

Hypothesis 1a: There is a negative relationship between the corporate
manager’s perceived cultural distance and CV performance.
Hypothesis 1b: There is a negative relationship between the CV
manager’s perceived cultural distance and CV performance.
Hypothesis 1c: There is a negative relationship between measured
cultural distance and CV performance.
Absorptive Capacity
If a venture is to receive advantages from its parent, not only does the parent have
to be willing to nurture the venture, but also the venture will need to accept nurturing.
Within the closed system of a corporation, over time the culture of the individuals and the
organization will become a singular homogenous culture (March, 1991). The culture can
only change when acted upon by individuals whose culture deviates from that of the
group (March, 1991). The culture of the parent through parenting can act upon the
venture and through the process transform the organizations and processes of the venture.
This transformation of a corporation’s internal organizations can become what
differentiates a venture from its competitors (Kuratko et al., 2015). This could prove
beneficial to the venture since successful corporate entrepreneurship can not only lead to
innovation in product offerings and markets, but also in internal organizations such as
processes and structures (Kuratko & Audretsch, 2013).
One potential benefit of cultural distance between a parent corporation and a
corporate venture is the opportunity to gain information (March, 1991). Since the parent
will have a different culture and likely different knowledge, the opportunity exists for the
parent corporation to transfer and augment the knowledge stockpile of the CV. Research
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has shown that corporations are relying on external knowledge to improve performance at
an increasing rate (Ireland et al., 2002; Zollo et al., 2002). Research shows that some
firms can derive great benefit from external knowledge (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006).
Managerial relationships are shown to impact the amount of interfirm knowledge transfer
that occurs (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). As a result of this constraint, the absorptive
capacity of a corporation can become a competitive advantage for the corporation (Zahra
& George, 2002).
Absorptive Capacity is the ability of a corporation to utilize external knowledge
through the successive learning processes (Lane et al., 2006). Learning is a multi-level
process that consists of acquiring, assimilating, and retaining new information (Lane et
al., 2006). Exploratory learning is the process through which corporations acquire new
external knowledge (Zahra & George, 2002). Exploitative learning is the process
through which the corporation assimilates external knowledge and applies it to the
corporation’s specific markets (Lane et al., 2006; Lenox & King, 2004). Transformative
learning links exploitative and exploratory learning; it is the process of retaining acquired
and assimilated knowledge over time (Lane et al., 2006). The result of these learning
processes, absorptive capacity, has been shown to have an impact greater than any
individual learning component as they gain synergy from complementarity and balance
(Lichtenthaler, 2009).
The learning capabilities of managers are associated with better performance of
CVs (Kuratko et al., 2009; Riley et al., 2009). Because absorptive capacity is a
representative measure of management’s ability to utilize each of the learning processes,
it is an appropriate construct for this study. The level of absorptive capacity that each CV
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management team possesses could be indicative of the amount of nurturing that the CV
will be able to receive from their corporate parent. The presence of cultural distance
between a CV and parent corporation could provide a prime opportunity for a venture to
gain external knowledge. The amount of absorptive capacity of the venture could impact
to what degree the venture will be able to capitalize on this opportunity and gain benefit
from its parent’s knowledge. Also, the absorptive capacity of the CV could be indicative
of whether the CV will abstain from assimilating to the parent corporation’s culture and
continue to resist the opportunity to learn and incorporate cultural change from their
parent. As such the amount of absorptive capacity a venture has will moderate the impact
cultural distance from the parent has on the success outcomes of the venture.
Hypothesis 2a: The absorptive capacity of the CV manager moderates the
negative relationship between the corporate manager’s perceived cultural
distance and CV performance and makes it less negative when the
absorptive capacity is lower.
Hypothesis 2b: The absorptive capacity of the CV manager moderates the
negative relationship between the CV manager’s perceived cultural
distance and CV performance and makes it less negative when the
absorptive capacity is lower.
Hypothesis 2c: The absorptive capacity of the CV manager moderates the
negative relationship between measured cultural distance and CV
performance and makes it less negative when the absorptive capacity is
lower.
Turbulence
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There is a lag between learning and change in culture (March, 1991). Learning
can occur at the individual level. However, for this to change corporate culture, the
learning will have to be disseminated throughout the corporation (March, 1991).
Research shows environmental conditions, such as turbulence, can impact to what degree
corporations seek out innovative activities and the rate at which they gather and
disseminate information (Kuratko et al., 2014a). Turbulence as proposed by Kohli &
Jaworski (1990), has three components: market turbulence, competitive intensity, and
technological turbulence. Turbulence is the combination of the extent to which the
composition and preferences of a corporation’s customers change over time, the
behavior, resources, and ability of competitors to differentiate, as well as the extent to
which technology in an industry was in a state of flux (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993). A
potential benefit of operating in high turbulence is it can increase the rate and amount of
change that occurs in a venture’s culture. Turbulent environments require that a company
adapt to the external environment and can lead managers to seek out new information and
opportunities to learn. Research has shown that in times of high environmental
turbulence, corporations will more actively seek out innovative activities (Kuratko et al.,
2014a). This need to actively innovate in a turbulent environment could alter the level of
impact cultural distance has on the amount of success that a venture realizes.
Corporations seek out innovative activities because unpredictable market
conditions lead to corporations not only being challenged to grow and venture but also
for the survival of the organization (Kuratko et al., 2014b). This could indicate that in
times of high environmental turbulence or in industries that are inherently turbulent,
managers may be more open to seeking out different and even radical ideas. The impact
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of environmental turbulence is twofold. First, firms have been shown to place different
values on their dynamic capabilities in turbulent environments (Eisenhardt & Martin,
2000). Second, in turbulent environments, it is more difficult for other firms to imitate
the actions of a firm, increasing the level of sustainability of any advantage created in a
turbulent environment (Helfat et al., 2009; Song et al., 2005). In a turbulent
environment, there may be a difference in the level of perceived opportunity to learn for
venture managers from the ideas of a culturally different parent.
When a corporation is engaged in corporate venturing and the venture operates in
high environmental turbulence, the venture manager may more actively seek external
knowledge from the corporate parent. Also, if a CV is operating in a turbulent
environment it may be more innovative than a CV in a less turbulent environment. This
would create a situation where a CV is generating innovation and knowledge at a high
rate and also seeking external knowledge at a high rate. The need to survive in turbulent
environments could increase the level of tolerance for cultural friction from both
managers and reduce the impact cultural distance has on the success of the venture.
While cultural distance would still exist between a parent and its CV, a high level of
environmental turbulence could facilitate an improved relationship between the
management teams leading to increased sharing between the two and a more successful
venture.
Hypothesis 3a: The level of turbulence moderates the negative
relationship between the corporate manager’s perceived cultural distance
and CV performance and makes it less negative when turbulence is higher.
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Hypothesis 3b: The level of turbulence moderates the negative
relationship between the CV manager’s perceived cultural distance and
CV performance and makes it less negative when turbulence is higher.
Hypothesis 3c: The level of turbulence moderates the negative
relationship between measured cultural distance and CV performance and
makes it less negative when turbulence is higher.
Congruence
Cultural distance research identifies one of the primary adverse effects of an
increase in cultural distance is the decrease of ease of communication between two
parties (Shenkar, 2001). The degree to which culturally distant managers agree on the
amount of cultural distance that exists could facilitate understanding and empathy and
reduce the amount of difficulty the managers have communicating. Greater ease of
communication between the managers could reduce the negative impact cultural distance
has on their relationship. This work was originally referring to the relationship between
corporations in multiple countries that would obviously have varying national cultures.
In this research, I extend this into the divergence of cultures that can occur between a
traditional corporation and their newly-created CV. Potentially the largest cost of
friction between a parent corporation manager and a CV manager would be the straining
of the relationship to the extent it causes a failure of a CV. Research supports this by
showing that the difficulties associated with CVs can be partially derived from nuanced
sources such as strained personal relationships between managers instigated in part by
divergent corporate cultures (Sherman, 1992; Tallman & Shenkar, 1994).
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A CV manager serves in the role of a professional manager for the parent
corporations’ wholly-owned CV. Scholars have shown that there is a benefit to having a
professional manager (Fama & Jensen, 1983). A strained relationship between the
professional manager of a CV and the corporate manager could decrease the amount of
benefit the corporation receives from its professional venture manager. This implies
obtaining congruence between the distant parties could have positive impacts on
performance. Congruence as to the amount of distance that exists could increase the
understanding and empathy between managers and lessen the intensity of the impact of
cultural distance on the relationship. While cultural distance between a parent
corporation and a CV seems necessary, cultural friction, which is correlated with negative
results, is not necessary. Cultural friction only occurs when the two cultures clash during
interaction (Shenkar, 2001). A possible contributor to an increase in the amount of
cultural friction between culturally different companies is a lack in the amount of
symmetry of perceived cultural distance. When asymmetry increases it would manifest
itself as a decrease in the level of congruence in the perceptions of the corporate and
venture manager as to the amount of cultural distance that exists between the two
companies. Thus, one manager would perceive the amount of distance to be significantly
larger or smaller than the other manager and be less understanding and empathetic.
Moving between cultures often requires a degree of translation; however, translations
may not always be perfect. Congruence of the managers’ perceptions of distance could
facilitate the managers having higher levels of understanding and empathy and even
though cultural distance exists if may have a less negative impact on the relationship and
not impede successful outcomes.
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Hypothesis 4a: The level of cultural distance congruence will moderate
the negative relationship between the corporate manager’s perceived
cultural distance and CV performance and makes it less negative when
congruence is higher.
Hypothesis 4b: The level of cultural distance congruence will moderate
the negative relationship between CV manager’s perceived cultural
distance and CV performance and makes it less negative when congruence
is higher.
Hypothesis 4c: The level of cultural distance congruence will moderate
the negative relationship between measured cultural distance and CV
performance and makes it less negative when congruence is higher.
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CHAPTER III: METHODS
This project relies on data collected through electronic surveys. I have collected
unique, dyadic survey data from both United States parent corporations and their CVs as
well as international parent corporations and their CVs. Collecting an international
dataset both increases the applicability of research and reduces the limitations of my
research. This study utilizes dyadic data collected from both the parent corporation and
the CV.
The Mergent Intellect Database was used to identify companies to target for
participation in this project. This database was appropriate for the scope of this project as
it included information on over 245 million companies throughout the world. The
database included information at both the corporation and executive levels. The
corporation level information included address, SIC codes, annual sales, and other
identifying information. The executive-level information included the title and contact
information of key executives. In the instance of US companies, the executive title in
combination with the size of the company was used to identify corporations that were
likely involved in corporate ventures.
It was possible that this data collection would have occasionally required inperson visits either initially or as a followup. For this reason, companies were originally
selected regionally to be near the university in the US or near the institution of the
international-contact assisting with data collection. In the US, the firms that were

32

identified fell into a twelve-state region that included West Virginia, Virginia, Tennessee,
Georgia, Kentucky, Indiana, Ohio, Illinois, Arkansas, Texas, North Carolina, and
Missouri. This research assumed that this is a broad geographic region containing a
diverse set of corporations and did not reduce generalizability.
There is a precedent in the literature to support conducting CV research on
samples of very large corporations. Previous research has utilized the companies found
in the Fortune 500 (e.g., Von Hippel, 1977; Klavans et al., 1985) or a list of the largest
corporations in a country (e.g., Thornhill & Amitt, 2001). Also, research indicates that
only large corporations are likely to have sufficient resource bases to support CV
activities (Burgelman & Valikangas, 2005). Following this trend, I have designed my
study to only include firms with $50 million or more in sales. To provide consistency
among the data, firms in all countries were selected for inclusion using the same sales
level. Additionally, among the US firms more extensive job title information is provided
and the pool for potential targets was confined to corporations with an executive title
indicative of a corporation engaging in CVs. The executive titles provided by Mergent
that were indicative of corporate venturing are Business Development Director, VP of
Corporate Development, and VP of Product Development.
To verify that the companies are involved in corporate venturing and to solicit
their participation in the survey, I contacted each of the identified companies. The
countries originally included in this project were The United States, Italy, Canada,
Germany, Spain, Mexico, Singapore, and Brazil. The preliminary number of
corporations identified per country is indicated below in Table 1. To aid in overcoming
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survivor bias, each identified corporation was asked not only to report on ongoing
ventures but ventures that have been terminated as well.

Initial calls were made to the originally identified corporations, with the intent to
send emails with invitations to participate in the research project. Due to intensive
screening protocols at these companies, I had to employ other tactics. Although I could
find the executive responsible for pursuing corporate ventures, there were rarely directline or email information provided so I would be relegated to talking to an operator or
administrative assistant. Corporations were then very guarded in granting me contact
with the executives themselves, but rather their assistant, so I couldn’t make my direct
pitch to the person I needed participation from. I used international partners at partnering
universities to gain participation in Mexico and Italy. I also used job title searches in
LinkedIn to send network requests to executives in charge of corporate venturing. In
LinkedIn, I had a total of 890 executives that either accepted my request to join my
network or responded to a message. I selected LinkedIn because it provided a medium
where I could initiate conversations directly with executives responsible for a
corporation’s venturing activities. An additional benefit of LinkedIn is it allowed me to
drop my geographic boundaries in the United States through which I was able to solicit
and receive participation from a geographically diverse group of corporations.
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From this effort, I had 40 corporations participate and complete surveys on
ventures. I eliminated one of these companies due to them not meeting the revenue
threshold. In total, I collected usable data from 39 corporations and 159 corporate
ventures, on average about four ventures per corporation. Of these 159 ventures, 74 were
internally generated and 85 were externally acquired. On average, the age of the venture
was 6.7 years. The distribution of the companies is shown below in Table 2. Overall
response rates were low, but ventures per corporation were good at about 4 per
corporation. The 39 corporations had an average revenue of $4.6B USD (s.d. $12.8B)
and average employees of 8,945 (s.d. 23,690). Using a semi-randomized sample of 50
non-respondents with a similar distribution by country, I compared respondents and
nonrespondents. This showed the nonresponding companies to have an average revenue
of $17.2B USD (s.d. $27.2B USD) and average employees of 51,404 (s.d. 91,334).
While this difference in the size of respondents and non-respondents is
uncommon among research in the area (e.g. Covin et al., 2016), it can be explained.
While most of the previous data collections into corporate venturing have been into only
US firms (e.g. Covin et al., 2016; Klavans es al., 1985), my data set is international and
the international corporations had lower average revenue than US firms $2.6B USD and
$5.9B USD, respectively. The average revenue of my data set is very similar to previous
research in this area (e.g. Covin et al., 2016) with an average of $5.5B USD. Also, it is
possible that from using the new approach with contacting executives through social
media, I was able to have conversations directly with executives from larger corporations.
In my experience, I was much more successful at starting conversations with
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international Fortune 1000 level executives using social media rather than calling or
attempting emails.

Data Collection
Surveys are shown to be the most appropriate means for collecting data pertaining
to corporate ventures (Shrader & Simon, 1997). Data from secondary sources lack the
nuances usually needed for detailed analysis of corporate ventures (Shrader & Simon,
1997). There is no secondary source from which data can be obtained for several of the
independent variables I am studying. I used surveys to collect my data for analysis.
While scholars have found it useful to hand-deliver surveys when conducting research on
CVs (Garrett et al., 2009; Covin et al., 2016), the international scope of this research
makes face-to-face interaction with all of the respondents infeasible. Due to this, I
utilized Qualtrics to distribute online surveys.
All of the companies identified as potentially engaging CVs in each country were
contacted to confirm that they were engaging in CVs and were willing to participate in
the study. The online survey is designed so that the participants initially answered
whether they are the corporate manager or the venture manager. If the respondent
selected corporate manager, they were first asked a set of identifying questions. They
were asked to identify the corporation they are at and to name the CV with either the
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actual name or a code name. If a code name was used, the venture manager was later
asked to provide this code name. The parent name and CV name was later used to
associate the correlating parent and venture data together. The corporate manager was
also asked to identify the name and email information of the venture manager so that they
could be contacted to complete the venture manager portion of the survey. In the cases of
a parent corporation with multiple ventures, the corporate manager was able to complete
the survey multiple times to include a survey for each venture.
The corporate manager was asked to complete information about each venture
indicating the background information about each venture. They were also asked to
answer questions about their perceptions of their company and the venture’s corporate
culture. Also, they were asked about the turbulence of the marketplace and the
absorptive capacity of the parent corporation. It was requested that they also complete
questions about the performance of the venture and the extent to which the parent
corporation has learned from the venture. The survey contained instructions to the
corporate manager that for the purposes of this research they are to consider only
businesses that were initially intended to operate as new businesses. They were provided
with a figure adapted from Morris et al. (2010) to identify if the venture constituted a new
business. See Figure 2. Corporate managers were asked to identify ventures that were
both still active and ventures that had been terminated. This research asked corporate
managers to consider defunct ventures to avoid skewing the results with survivor bias.
Research identifies seven years or less as an appropriate range for identifying new
business ventures (McDougall, 1989; Zahra et al. 2000; & Covin et al., 2016). As such,
managers were asked only to consider ventures that were seven years old or less.
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Independent Variables
Cultural Distance
Corporate cultural distance is the measure of how different corporate cultures are.
Cultural distance is often measured using the scale developed by Kogut and Singh (1988)
where the scale is used to measure how far removed from a singular culture the other
cultures are. This approach could be leading to confounded variables problems where the
results are not representative of cultural distance, but are a representation of national
cultural effects of the various countries compared to the country of the base culture
(Brouthers et al., 2016). As suggested by Brouthers et al. (2016), in this research I use
samples of parent corporations from more than two different home countries to overcome
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this confounded variable problem. Another problem with the traditional way of
measuring cultural distance is that the subtleties of culture are notoriously difficult to
conceptualize and scale (Shenkar, 2001). This is partly due to culture having many
different aspects that can each impact the relationship between two firms (Tallman &
Shenkar, 1994). To overcome this, I am using an adapted version of the scale developed
by Chatterjee et al. (1992) which measures multiple components of the corporate culture.
This instrument contains seven components of corporate culture: 1) innovation and action
orientation, 2) risk-taking attitude, 3) lateral independence, 4) top management contact,
5) autonomy and decision-making, 6) performance orientation, and 7) reward orientation.
These are determined using a total of twenty-nine questions, each of which is answered
using a seven-point Likert scale. Both managers are asked to compare the culture of their
company with that of either the parent or CV. A response of “1” indicates the two are
very similar and a response of “7” indicates the two are very different. Culture is
composed of many perceptions and nuances that are difficult to measure (Shenkar, 2001).
To overcome this, I adapt the instrument to provide a confirming measure of distance.
Using the same series of questions, I ask both the parent and CV manager to rate the level
of importance of each concept to their company. The questions are measured using a
seven-point scale. An answer of “1” indicates the respondent strongly agrees that the
concept is important and an answer of “7” indicates the respondent strongly disagrees.
From these two measures, I calculate cultural distance as the absolute distance between
the two responses which should help control for each manager’s perceptions of the other
company. The full set of questions and the description of the scale is available in the
index.
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Cultural distance was collected from both the corporate and venture manager.
These two scales were both shown to have strong reliability as they both showed a
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.97. I then used the six components that loaded heaviest on to the
first factor to create a single summated scale for each measure following the
recommendations of Aiken & West (1991). To create the calculated measure for cultural
distance, I measured corporate culture of the parent corporation and venture from their
respective managers. These scales were both shown to have strong reliability with
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.94 and 0.93, respectively. Using the same technique, I then created
a summated score for each of the individual companies’ culture and found the absolute
value difference between the parent and venture to create “calculated cultural distance.”
Absorptive Capacity
Absorptive capacity is the ability of a firm to utilize external knowledge through
the processes of exploratory, transformative, and exploitative learning (Lane et al., 2006).
To measure this, I utilize the absorptive capacity scale developed previously by scholars
(Lichtenthaler, 2009). The scale is comprised of six total items to measure the three
types of learning. The three types of learning are: exploratory, exploitative, and
transformative. Each of the three types of learning is divided into two subscales.
Exploratory learning is comprised of the ability first to recognize and then assimilate
information. Exploitative learning is composed of the ability to both transmute and apply
information. Transformative learning is comprised of the ability to both maintain and
then reactivate information. The scale is comprised of twenty-five individual questions,
all of which are adapted to be answered using a seven-point Likert scale. The questions
ask each manager to rate their level of agreement that their company engages in various
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activities where a “1” indicates they strongly disagree and a “7” indicates they strongly
agree.
Absorptive capacity was measured for both the parent corporation and the
venture. These scales were both tested and showed strong reliability with Cronbach’s
alpha of 0.95 and 0.96, respectively. Then, following the guidance of Aiken and West
(1991), I used the six components that loaded the heaviest to the first factor to create
summated scores for each of these variables.
Turbulence
Turbulence for this research is measured as comprehensive environmental
turbulence. Environmental turbulence is the rate of change in the composition of the
environment (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993). To capture this, I used an instrument that both
measures for turbulence and the competitive intensity of the environment. The
turbulence instrument I used was developed through the previous work of scholars
(Jaworski & Kohli, 1993). This scale is comprised of three items: market turbulence,
competitive intensity, and technological turbulence. The turbulence scale is comprised of
fifteen total questions of which each manager is asked to express their agreement with the
statements about the state of the environment using a seven-point Likert scale. A
response of “1” indicates that the manager strongly disagrees and a response of “7”
indicates that they strongly agree. This item was collected from the venture manager. In
this study, I considered what is the impact of change in turbulences at the venture level,
from the CV’s industry, and how it impacts perceptions of success. The full set of
questions and the description of the scale are available in the Appendix.
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The scale for turbulence showed strong reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha score
of 0.87. Following the guidance of Aiken and West (1991) I used the six components
that loaded the heaviest to the first factor to create summated scores for each of these
variables.
Perceived Cultural Distance Congruence
The perceived cultural distance congruence item is a calculated measure. This
item is calculated as the absolute distance between the responses of the manager of the
parent corporation and the CV manager to their amount of perceived cultural distance
between the two companies. Since culture contains perceptions and nuances (Shenkar,
2001), and since cultural distance is not inherently symmetrical from each company to
the other (Shenkar, 2001), this added variable will offer insight into understanding the
impact of perceptions about culture and cultural distance. This variable is the calculated
absolute value between the summated scores for cultural distance measured from the
perspective of both the corporate and venture manager.
Dependent Variables
Venture Performance
In this study, venture performance was measured using a multiple question scale.
These questions were asked of the corporate manager as s/he had access to the complete
financial profile and corporate expectations for the CV. This was measured on a 7-point
Likert scale where 1 signaled strongly disagree and 7 signaled strongly agree. The four
questions asked about performance were: 1.) The venture generally meets (or met) the
expectations of the parent corporation, 2.) The parent corporation views (or viewed) this
venture as being successful, overall, 3.) The parent corporation believes (or believed) that
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this venture achieved its key milestones (i.e., events crucial to the venture’s successful
development) on schedule for each stage of its development, & 4.) This venture is
performing (or performed) well in terms of the criteria (e.g., financial returns, market
share, learning/acquisition of new knowledge) the parent corporation considers (or
considered) important to the venture’s success. If the venture had been terminated, the
corporate manager was asked to answer these questions for the venture’s final year of
operation. This is important due to the understanding that a venture could terminate for
reasons other than failure, such as it reached its end goal (Geringer & Hebert, 1991).
This measure of venture success was measured using the scales developed and
used by Kuratko et al., (2009). The utilization of a manager’s subjective evaluations of
performance has been widely used in research (e.g., Dess & Robinson, 1984; Covin et al.,
1990; Garrett & Covin, 2015). An advantage of utilizing subjective measures is that it
allows us to collect performance data on early-stage ventures even if objective data is not
yet available (Dess & Robinson, 1984). These subjective performance measures were
collected from both the corporate manager and the venture manager. Since it is the
parent corporation that ultimately decides if the venture will continue operations, the
corporate manager's responses were utilized as the dependent variable. Also, even
though subjective performance measures gained from managers can be influenced by
personality (Zahra et al., 2002) and the individual manager’s perceptions (Bantel, 1998),
the corporate manager is less likely to be overly biased in overestimating the performance
of the CV.
The scale for venture success was tested for reliability and yielded a Cronbach’s
alpha of 0.95, indicating strong scale reliability. After testing the reliability using the
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guidance of Aiken and West (1991), I used the four individual components of venture
success to create a summated success score.
Control Variables
I captured and utilized three corporation level controls in my model. The three
used were: number of employees, number of ventures, and percentage of sales in largest
industry. The number of employees was measured by asking the corporate manager an
open-ended question. The average number of employees among the corporations that
participated was 12,194 (s.d. 28,622). The number of ventures was measured as the
number of ventures the corporation had started in the last seven years. The average
response from the participating corporations was 10.7 (s.d. 12.3) ventures. The corporate
manager was also asked to identify which percentage of the corporation’s total annual
sales came from their single largest industry. The average response from the
participating corporations was 75.13 (s.d. 22) percentage.
I also captured and utilized six venture-level controls in my model. The six used
were: stage of the venture, the number of ventures previously manage by the venture
manager, venture age, venture autonomy, operational independence, and learning
extensiveness. The stage of the venture was qualified as 1.) Early Stage Venture that has
received funding but not yet generated any revenue, 2.) Middle Stage Venture that is
generating revenue but is not profitable, or 3.) Established Stage Venture that is currently
generating some level of profit. The average of the participating ventures was 1.68 (s.d.
0.83). The venture manager was asked as a measure of experience how many ventures
s/he had previously managed not including the current venture. The average among the
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participating managers was 4.9 (s.d. 1.2) ventures. The venture age was collected from
the venture manager and I found an average age of 6.6 (s.d. 3.3) years.
Venture autonomy was also collected and utilized as a control from the venture
manager. The scale used for venture autonomy was first developed and utilized in
Johnson (2012). The construct of venture autonomy was used to measure the extent to
which the venture management was responsible for establishing goals, timetables, and
internal operations of the venture (Johnson, 2012). This scale consisted of twelve
statements to which the venture manager indicated their level of agreement using a
seven-point Likert scale. For a full list of the statements, please refer to the appendix. I
used Chronbach’s alpha to test the reliability of the scale and received a score of 0.93,
indicating the scale had strong reliability. Using the advice of Aiken & West (1991), I
used these multiple components to create a single summated score for analysis. The
result of this summated score was an average of 4.46 (s.d. 1.63).
Operations independence was also collected and utilized as a control from the
venture manager. The scale used for operations independence was first developed and
utilized in Johnson (2012). The construct of operations independence was used to
measure to what extent the venture’s operations were linked to those of the corporation
and its other businesses (Johnson, 2012). This scale consisted of three statements to
which the venture manager was asked to express their level of agreement to using a
seven-point Likert scale. For a complete list of the statements used, please refer to the
appendix. I used Chronbach’s alpha to test the reliability of the scale and received a
score of 0.89, indicating that the scale had strong reliability. Using the advice of Aiken
and West (1991), I used these multiple components to create a single summated score for
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use in my analysis. The result of this summated score was an average level of
independence of 5.25 (s.d. 1.22).
Learning extensiveness of the venture was also collected and utilized as a control
variable in the models. The scale used to collect learning extensiveness had previously
been utilized in Covin et al., (2018). Learning extensiveness refers to the level to which a
venture can obtain and apply valuable knowledge from their corporate parent (Covin et
al., 2018). This scale consisted of eleven statements in which the venture manager was
asked to what degree their level of knowledge had increased since the start of the venture.
They were asked to use a seven-point Likert scale to indicate the amount to which their
level of knowledge had increased. For a complete list of the statements and scale used,
please refer to the appendix. I used Chronbach’s alpha to test the reliability of this scale
and received a score of 0.93, indicating that the scale had strong reliability. I then used
the advice of Aiken and West (1991) to consolidate these factors into a single summated
score. The result of the summated score was average learning extensiveness of 4.46 (s.d.
1.48).
Analysis Techniques
The complete research model which includes moderation was analyzed using
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM). HLM is appropriate, because of the two levels of
the corporate parent and the venture level data. Several of the items used in this study
were originally developed using exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to develop constructs
(e.g., cultural distance, absorptive capacity, and environmental turbulence). I used
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to verify that the individual items are reliably loading
to the constructs with the sample that I am using. Secondly, I used HLM8 to test the
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moderating hypothesis as well as the complete model. In accordance with the
recommendation of Aiken & West (1991), I tested my moderation hypothesis by
centering the variables in the moderation relationship and creating a moderation term
through the multiplication of these new centered variables. In addition to collecting the
independent and dependent variables described, I also collected control variables not
directly related to the model of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS
Tables 3 and 4 below show the descriptive statistics and correlations between the
research variables. I present the HLM results in Tables 5-7. Table 5 is the research
model using cultural distance measured from the perspective of the corporate manager.
Table 6 uses cultural distance from the perspective of the venture manager, and Table 7 is
the calculated cultural distance measure. In each of these three tables, I show all four
HLM models. Model 1includes all of the control variables. The independent variable of
cultural distance is added in model 2. Model 3 then adds each of the moderator variables
and finally, Model 4 includes the interaction terms.
I first ran a naïve model in HLM, which is a model that only includes the
independent variable. From this naïve model, I was able to obtain sigma squared and tau
scores which I then used to calculate the variance explained at both the corporate level,
level two, and venture level, level one. Using sigma squared and tau from the HLM
naïve model I calculated that 22% of the variance is explained from corporate-level data,
confirming that HLM is the appropriate option for analyzing this data.
I then used HLM to run my full empirical models of the 159 ventures. In each of
the three empirical models, Tables 5-7, the HLM analysis showed that one of the control
variables, Learning Extensiveness, is positively related with the level of venture success
(p<.05). The three empirical models only showed a statistically significant relationship
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between cultural distance and venture success when cultural distance was measured from
the perspective of the venture manager, Table 6.

Table 3.
Descriptive Statistics
Mean

Std.
Deviation

α

5.41

1.45

0.95

2 Cultural Distance
(corporate manager)

2.84

1.76

0.97

3 Cultural Distance
(venture manager)

3.08

1.59

0.97

4 Cultural Distance
(calculated)

1.14

0.98

n.a.

5 Absorptive Cabacity
(venture)

4.82

1.33

0.96
0.87
n.a.

Variables
1 Venture Success

6 Turbulence

4.28

1.19

7 Congruence

1.16

1.30

8 Employees of
Corporation*

12,193.89

28,622.04

9 # of Ventures Started
in the last 7 years*

10.68

12.28

n.a.

75.13

22.00

n.a.

1.68

0.83

n.a.

4.88

1.19

n.a.

6.64

3.27

n.a.

10 Corporate % of
revenue from largest
industry*
11 Stage of the Venture
12 # of ventures
previously managed
13 Venture Age (in
years)
14 Venture Autonomy

n.a.

4.46

1.63

0.93

15 Operational
Independence of Venture

5.25

1.22

0.89

16 Learning
Extensiveness of
Venture Mgr

4.46

1.48

0.93

* These variables are measured at the corporate parent level, so N=37
(vs. 159 for the other variables which are measured at the venture
level).
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Table 6 shows that when measuring cultural distance from the perspective of the
venture manager, there is a main effect and that an increase in cultural distance is
negatively related with the level of venture success (p<.05). All three empirical models,
Tables 5-7, show that regardless of the manner of measuring cultural distance, one of the
proposed moderators had a direct effect, congruence between the corporate and venture
managers’ perceptions of cultural distance. This showed that an increase in a lack of
congruence between the perceptions of the two managers is negatively related to venture
success (p<.001). The empirical model using cultural distance measured from the
venture manager, Table 6, shows statistically significant interaction effects. Table 6
shows that when using cultural distance measured from the perspective of the venture
manager shows that the absorptive capacity of the venture positively moderates the
relationship between cultural distance and venture success (p<.001).
Cultural distance was measured in three separate manners for this research: from
the perspective of the corporate manager, from the perspective of the venture manager,
and a calculated score based on the two manager’s perceptions of their own company’s
culture. I used these three separate measures to run my three separate sets of HLM
models and test my various sets of hypotheses. Of the three manners of measuring
cultural distance, the measure from the perspective of the venture manager was the only
one to be statistically significant at the p<.1 level. This only showed support for
Hypothesis 1b from my first set of hypotheses. The complete results of which
hypotheses were supported or not supported can be seen in Table 8. The hypotheses that
were supported showed support that an increase in cultural distance from the perspective
of the venture manager negatively impacted venture success. The research also found
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support for Hypothesis 2b. Support for this hypothesis supported that an increase in the
absorptive capacity of the venture positively moderated the impact of cultural distance on
the success of the venture.
Table 8.
Hypotheses Results
Hypothesis
Supported or Not
1a.
Not Supported
1b.
Supported*
1c.
Not Supported
2a.
Not Supported
2b.
Supported***
2c.
Not Supported
3a.
Not Supported
3b.
Not Supported
3c.
Not Supported
4a.
Not Supported
4b.
Not Supported
4c.
Not Supported
Final estimation of fixed effects (with robust standard errors
in parenthesis) are reported +p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01;
***p<.001

I tested for the potential of endogeneity using instrumental variables. I chose
these instrumental variables using the criteria that they not be correlated with my research
model’s dependent variable. I chose “parent-venture similarity” and “top management
support of the venture”. While some authors prefer to use different software packages
and specific statistical tests for testing endogeneity (i.e. Stata and the Wu-Hausman test),
these were not the most appropriate for my data. HLM is a statistical modeling technique
that can account for variation at multiple levels and is appropriate to use when working
with nested data (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Fortunately, there is an analysis technique
developed my Semadeni et al., (2014) that allows for testing for endogeneity while using
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HLM. I used the two-stage analytical approach recommended by Semadeni et al., (2014)
with my data to test for endogeneity. I used SPSS to run simple regressions with my
instrumental variables and regress these on the dependent variable. From these simple
regression models, I saved the residuals as new variables. I then added these new
variables to my HLM models. The addition of this new variable did not significantly
impact any of the hypothesized effects. Since the addition of this variable in essence left
the research model unchanged it suggests that endogeneity is not a problem in my
models.
Due to the nature of the data, having very large standard deviations among size
measures of the participating corporation, I was concerned that heterogeneity of the data
may be impacting my results. A common test for heterogeneity is to remove the outliers
and then run the model without outliers. To test this, I followed the advice of Howell et
al. (1998) by removing corporations from the data set further than three standard
deviations from the mean revenue of corporations. With my data, the large standard
deviation created a problem. Because the standard deviation was larger than the mean,
this process only resulted in removing one corporation from consideration. The results of
running the model without this one corporation had no significant changes.
Heterogeneity of error variance can be a large problem in data analysis if
variances are a result of level 1 or level 2 variables and are not random (Raudenbush &
Byrk, 2002). Luckily in HLM 7 and above, it is possible to test for these problems by
running the variance-covariance components test of level 2 variables and homogeneity of
level 1 variables (Garson, 2013). Following the advice of Raudenbush & Byrk (2002), I
was able to see if heterogeneity in the data was significantly impacting my results. To do
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this, I first obtained the deviance from my base HLM model. I then added this into the
model of hypothesis testing and set the model to test for homogeneity. The variancecovariance components test yielded a p-value of greater than 0.500. This result signals
that level 2 covariance reduced deviance by a non-significant amount (Garson, 2013).
The results of the homogeneity test yielded a p-value of greater than 0.500. This tested
the assumption that when the model is run for each of the 159 ventures, they have
homogenous residual variance (Garson, 2013). The result of this test was a nonsignificant p-value, which indicates heterogeneity in the data is not a problem
(Raudenbush & Byrk, 2002).
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CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION
The implications of this research are a contribution in the already established but
underdeveloped theory of parenting advantage. The parenting advantage literature shows
that a venture can perform better by having a particular corporate parent than any other
corporate parent (Campbell et al., 1995). What the parenting advantage doesn’t consider
is that this may be a more complex issue than just if a corporate parent has beneficial or
complementary resources or assets for their venture. There could be underlying factors
that strain this parental relationship and inhibit the parent corporation from sufficiently
nurturing their venture and transferring the parenting advantage to them. This concept
has gained support in research of human parents and their offspring as cultural distance
between parents and children has shown negative outcomes in the children (Tseng &
Fuligni, 2000). This research found evidence that an increase in the amount cultural
distance between a corporate parent and their CV leads to a decrease in the success of the
respective CV. This implies that venture success is not purely a function of how well the
products, markets, or technologies of the parent and venture mesh together. The
parenting relationship between a corporation and its ventures is more complex than
originally thought and is impacted by the amount of distance from the other company.
The increase in distance may be straining the relationship between the two companies,
thereby inhibiting the extent to which a parent can transfer any parenting advantage they
may have to their offspring.
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Cultural distance is one of the most popular constructs in international business
research (Shenkar, 2012). While CVs are used as vehicles through which corporations
can enter new international markets (i.e. Birkinshaw, 1997; Callaway, 2008) until this
point it had not been included in CV literature. Cultural distance measured from the
perspective of the venture manager was shown to be the most statistically significant of
the three measures of distance. This implies that the venture and its employees,
represented by the opinions of the venture manager, could be most sensitive to feeling a
sense of “distance” or “isolation” from the parent corporation. Shenkar (2001) found that
an increase in cultural distance can create a “drag” that results in more difficult
communications and a poorer quality relationship. I found support that when the venture
manager perceives there is a greater amount of cultural distance between the parent and
venture there is indeed a decrease in the success of the venture. This finding could lead
to lead to a method for improving CV success. It is possible, as I have demonstrated, to
learn about the perceptions of culture that the CV and corporate managers have. This
data can be collected by corporations and then used not only to analyze and better
understand the relationship between the two managers but also to coach the managers
about these perceptions and how to work through them. This could provide corporations
a method through which to improve relationships and CV performance before a CV fails.
I devised a calculated measure for cultural distance that was calculated with the
intent to avoid any biases or prejudices of the venture and corporate manager. This
measure was not shown to have a statistically significant impact on venture success. This
supports the assertion by Shenkar (2001) that there is no reason to assume symmetry in
cultural distance. The calculated measure of cultural distance assumes symmetry in the
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relationship and was not found to have a statistically significant relationship. This
implies that it is not so much a pure measure of cultural distance that creates friction as it
is the perceptions of distance by the managers. In practice, this could lead to a change in
the way corporations communicate and deal with their ventures. Corporations need to
improve their ability to communicate effectively with and nurture the ventures that they
start. There needs to be a certain amount of understanding or compassion for these newly
started or acquired businesses. While ventures are asked to operate, sometimes
physically or culturally far from the parent corporation, they need to clearly understand
the goals and purposes of the venture and have this communicated to them clearly from
the parent. The parent needs to communicate not only how the venture will be measured
in matters of success, but also how the venture will be operating and the venture’s role
with the parent corporation.
Although the corporate manager has the obligation to understand the culture of a
venture is different and make its managers feel like they are understood, the venture
manager in turn has the obligation to understand the venture is culturally different and
interact as harmoniously as possible with the parent corporation. Understanding that
there is often an amount of cultural distance between the two companies should lead the
managers to be more understanding while engaging in interactions between the two
distant companies. This distance may manifest itself in both unique processes, mental
and physical, and jargon for describing these activities. A distant culture in this way
without the proper level of understanding could function in the same way as having
conversations in multiple languages. An increase in understanding distance exists and
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the languages are not the same should lead to more patience and both sides articulating
their respective points in a manner more concise.
Scholars have noted a failure within CV research to include multiple sources of
data and align with major theoretical streams (Ireland & Webb, 2007; Hill & Gorgoulas,
2016). This research used multiple scales from major theoretical streams that contained
multiple components as part of the survey that was distributed. Three of these types of
scales absorptive capacity, turbulence, and corporate culture had interesting loadings.
While each of the components could be separated out and showed strong scale validity
and the scales naturally load onto the same number of components, there was usually
comingling in one primary factor that had the heaviest loadings. This could indicate that,
at least with this data set, these traits are simultaneously manifesting across the various
subdimensions. This should lead to further exploration into these scales as it may be
possible in the setting of large corporations, they will frequently manifest themselves in
this way and not as scales with multiple clear components.
Scholars have previously found that there is no correlation between the number of
CVs a corporation has previously started and the amount of success each venture
achieves (Kuratko et al., 2009). This research provides many insights and directions for
potential future research, as it implies the relationship between the two liaisons could be
very influential on the amount of success a new venture achieves. Although not part of
the model, I found support for a relationship between both learning extensiveness and
congruence between the managers’ perceptions of corporate culture and venture success.
Congruence is a calculated measure of the distance between the corporate and venture
managers’ responses to cultural distance. This relationship is very difficult to collect
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primary data on, especially dyadic data from both companies. This rare glimpse into this
relationship indicates a need to explore further the intricacies of this relationship and
explore further how the level of agreement, or the two managers being on the same page,
impacts their relationship and eventual success of the venture. I believe this is a very
interesting point to explore further as it relates to the perceptions of culture more than a
pure distance of culture. This is particularly interesting because while the distance
between a parent and its venture is unavoidable, feelings of distance can be changed
through changes in the way the two management teams interact with each other.
Also, while this model analyzes an international data set with ventures from
multiple countries, it does not control for any impact national culture may have on the
relationship. I believe there is an opportunity to explore the relationship between national
cultural and corporate culture in the future with this data set. In the context of
international corporations there is an opportunity to investigate how strongly national
culture can moderate the corporate culture of an international firm entering that market.
The ability of a corporation to adapt to a new national culture could impact the amount of
success the corporation can obtain in this new culture, assuming it is different than the
culture of its’ home country.
As with any research, this study is not immune to having limitations. While this is
an international data set, it does not include every country or region. I was unable to
include any Asian or African corporations or ventures, for example. While my research
applies to the western world as it includes ventures from Canada through South America,
it may lack applicability in far eastern cultures where I was unable to gain data.
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It also appears, based on the similarity in the size of corporations between my
study and former studies in the area (e.g. Covin et al., 2016) that there is a natural
selection bias of certain size corporations to participate. In my experience, the largest
corporations, while involved in corporate venturing were more worried about protecting
data and privacy than participating and potentially learning from research. Also, smaller
corporations that may be interested in or participating in venturing activities didn’t
qualify to participate in this type of research. While this research should be
representative of the average corporation involved in corporate venturing, it may not be
applicable to either the largest or smallest corporations involved in corporate venturing as
they may face a unique set of challenges uncommon in the majority of venturing
corporations.
While my response rates per country were low this seems to be a recurring
problem in this research. In part, because it is difficult to identify and/or obtain primary
data from corporations involved in corporate venturing a large part of the body of
research of the field is qualitative (Garrett, 2010). The majority of the few data
collections into corporate venturing (i.e. Burgers et al., 2009; Covin & Garrett 2009) only
collected data in their respective home countries. This collection of primary data marks
one of the first attempts to collect an international primary data set into corporate
venturing. While per country response rates are low, this collection does include a
comparable number to total ventures to previous research. In an effort to normalize the
data I did use the same criteria to include corporations involved in corporate venturing in
every country.
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In conclusion, this research has the potential to make both theoretical and
practical contirbutions, because my findings show support for the proposition that the
perceptions of culture impact the success of a corporate venture. While it may be
difficult to change perceptions, changing these perceptions could finally lead to higher
success rates among corporate ventures. While facing limitations, this research is widely
applicable as it includes corporations and ventures from various countries and of a wide
range of sizes. This research should provide a basis to expand this field of research to
more carefully understand and improve the relationship between management of parent
corporations and their ventures. This research shows this rarely explored relationship is
deserving of more efforts as it impacts the amount of success a venture can have. Also,
since this is a relationship it is something that can be improved through altering the
actions of the various actors to better maintain levels of harmonious homeostasis.

64

REFERENCES
Adams, R. M. (1969). An approach to new business ventures. Research Management,
12(4), 255-260.
Aiken, L. S., West, S. G., & Reno, R. R. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and
interpreting interactions. Sage.
Bantel, K. A. (1998). Technology-based,“adolescent” firm configurations: Strategy
identification, context, and performance. Journal of Business Venturing, 13(3),
205-230.
Biggadike, E. R. (1979). Corporate diversification: Entry, strategy, and performance,
205. Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard
University; Cambridge, MA.
Birkinshaw, J. (1997). Entrepreneurship in multinational corporations: The characteristics
of subsidiary initiatives. Strategic management journal, 18(3), 207-229.
Björkman, I., Stahl, G. K., & Vaara, E. (2007). Cultural differences and capability
transfer in cross-border acquisitions: The mediating roles of capability
complementarity, absorptive capacity, and social integration. Journal of
International Business Studies, 38(4), 658-672.
Black, J. S., & Mendenhall, M. (1991). The U-curve adjustment hypothesis revisited: A
review and theoretical framework. Journal of International Business Studies,
22(2), 225-247.

65

Brouthers, K. D., Geisser, K. D., & Rothlauf, F. (2016). Explaining the
internationalization of ibusiness firms. Journal of International Business Studies,
47(5), 513-534.
Burgelman, R. A. (1983). A process model of internal corporate venturing in the
diversified major firm. Administrative science quarterly, 28(2), 223-244.
Burgelman, R. A., & Välikangas, L. (2005). Managing internal corporate venturing
cycles. MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(4), 26.
Burgers, J.H., Jansen, J.J.P., Van den Bosch, F.A.J., & Volberda, H.W. (2009). Structural
differentiation and corporate venturing: the moderating role of formal and
informal integration mechanisms. Journal of Business Venturing, 24(3), 206-220.
Callaway, S. K. (2008). Global corporate ventures: a new trend of international corporate
entrepreneurship. Multinational Business Review, 16(3), 1-22.
Campbell, A., Goold, M., & Alexander, M. (1995). Corporate strategy: the quest for
parenting advantage. Harvard business review, 73(2), 120-132.
Cassiman, B., & Veugelers, R. (2006). In search of complementarity in innovation
strategy: Internal R&D and external knowledge acquisition. Management science,
52(1), 68-82.
Chatterjee, S., Lubatkin, M. H., Schweiger, D. M., & Weber, Y. (1992). Cultural
differences and shareholder value in related mergers: Linking equity and human
capital. Strategic management journal, 13(5), 319-334.
Christensen, C. M., Alton, R., Rising, C., & Waldeck, A. (2011). The big idea: The new
M&A playbook. Harvard Business Review, 89(3), 48-57.

66

Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1990). The implications of spillovers for R&D
investment and welfare: a new perspective. Administrative Science Quarterly,
35(1990), 128-152.
Covin, J. G., Garrett Jr, R. P., Gupta, J. P., Kuratko, D. F., & Shepherd, D. A. (2016). The
interdependence of planning and learning among internal corporate ventures.
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice.
Covin, J. G., Slevin, D. P., & Covin, T. J. (1990). Content and performance of growthseeking strategies: A comparison of small firms in high-and low technology
industries. Journal of Business Venturing, 5(6), 391-412.
Dess, G. G., Lumpkin, G. T., & McGee, J. E. (1999). Linking corporate entrepreneurship
to strategy, structure, and process: Suggested research directions.
Entrepreneurship theory and practice, 23(3), 85-102.
Dess, G. G., & Robinson, R. B. (1984). Measuring organizational performance in the
absence of objective measures: the case of the privately‐held firm and
conglomerate business unit. Strategic management journal, 5(3), 265-273.
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Martin, J. A. (2000). Dynamic capabilities: what are they?.
Strategic management journal, 21(10/11), 1105-1121.
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. The journal of
law and Economics, 26(2), 301-325.
Fast, N. D. (1979). The future of industrial new venture departments. Industrial
Marketing Management, 8(4), 264-273.
Garrett, R. P. (2010). Challenges of quantitative research on internal corporate
venturing. International Journal of Entrepreneurial Venturing, 2(2), 129-143.

67

Garrett, R. P., & Covin, J. G. (2014). Parent Prospects, Resource Slack, and the
Operations Independence of Internal Corporate Ventures. In Academy of
Management Proceedings (Vol. 2014, No. 1, p. 16237). Briarcliff Manor, NY
10510: Academy of Management.
Garrett, R. P., & Covin, J. G. (2015). Internal Corporate Venture Operations
Independence and Performance: A Knowledge‐Based Perspective.
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 39(4), 763-790.
Garrett, R. P., Covin, J. G., & Slevin, D. P. (2009). Market responsiveness, top
management risk taking, and the role of strategic learning as determinants of
market pioneering. Journal of Business Research, 62(8), 782-788.
Garrett, R. P., & Neubaum, D. O. (2013). Top management support and Initial strategic
assets: A dependency model for internal corporate venture performance. Journal
of Product Innovation Management, 30(5), 896-915.
Garson, G. D. (2013). Introductory guide to HLM with HLM 7 software. Hierarchical
linear modeling: Guide and applications, 55-96.
Gompers, P., & Lerner, J. (1998). Venture capital distributions: Short‐run and long‐run
reactions. The Journal of Finance, 53(6), 2161-2183.
Gompers, P., & Lerner, J. (2001). The venture capital revolution. Journal of economic
perspectives, 15(2), 145-168.
Gupta, A. K., Smith, K. G., & Shalley, C. E. (2006). The interplay between exploration
and exploitation. Academy of management journal, 49(4), 693-706.
Hanan, M. (1976). Venturing corporations-think small to stay strong. Harvard Business
Review, 54(3), 139-148.

68

Helfat, C. E., Finkelstein, S., Mitchell, W., Peteraf, M., Singh, H., Teece, D., & Winter,
S. G. (2009). Dynamic capabilities: Understanding strategic change in
organizations. John Wiley & Sons.
Hill, S. A., & Birkinshaw, J. (2014). Ambidexterity and survival in corporate venture
units. Journal of management, 40(7), 1899-1931.
Hill, S. A., & Georgoulas, S. (2016). 1. Internal corporate venturing: a review of (almost)
five decades of literature. Handbook of Research on Corporate Entrepreneurship,
13.
Hill, S. A., Maula, M. V., Birkinshaw, J. M., & Murray, G. C. (2009). Transferability of
the venture capital model to the corporate context: Implications for the
performance of corporate venture units. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 3(1),
3-27.
Hitt, M. A., Bierman, L., Uhlenbruck, K., & Shimizu, K. (2006). The importance of
resources in the internationalization of professional service firms: The good, the
bad, and the ugly. Academy of Management Journal, 49(6), 1137-1157.
Hlavacek, J. D., & Thompson, V. A. (1978). Bureaucracy and venture failures. Academy
of Management Review, 3(2), 242-248.
Howell, D. C., Rogier, M., Yzerbyt, V., & Bestgen, Y. (1998). Statistical methods in
human sciences. New York: Wadsworth, 721.
Ireland, R. D., Hitt, M. A., & Vaidyanath, D. (2002). Alliance management as a source of
competitive advantage. Journal of management, 28(3), 413-446.
Ireland, R. D., & Webb, J. W. (2007). Strategic entrepreneurship: Creating competitive
advantage through streams of innovation. Business horizons, 50(1), 49-59.

69

Jaworski, B. J., & Kohli, A. K. (1993). Market orientation: antecedents and
consequences. The Journal of marketing, 53-70.
Johnson, K. L. (2012). The role of structural and planning autonomy in the performance
of internal corporate ventures. Journal of Small Business Management, 50(3),
469-497.
Kaplan, S. N., & Minton, B. (2006). How has CEO turnover changed? Increasingly
performance sensitive boards and increasingly uneasy CEOs (No. w12465).
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Keil, T., McGrath, R. G., & Tukiainen, T. (2009). Gems from the ashes: Capability
creation and transformation in internal corporate venturing. Organization Science,
20(3), 601-620.
Kim, S. Y., Gonzales, N. A., Stroh, K., & Wang, J. J. L. (2006). Parent–child cultural
marginalization and depressive symptoms in Asian American family
members. Journal of Community Psychology, 34(2), 167-182.
King, D. R., Covin, J. G., & Hegarty, W. H. (2003). Complementary resources and the
exploitation of technological innovations. Journal of Management, 29(4), 589606.
Klavans, R., Shanley, M., & Evan, W. M. (1985). The Management of Internal Corporate
Ventures-Entrepreneurship and Innovation. Columbia Journal of World Business,
20(2), 21-27.
Kogut, B., & Singh, H. (1988). The effect of national culture on the choice of entry
mode. Journal of international business studies, 19(3), 411-432.

70

Kohli, A. K., & Jaworski, B. J. (1990). Market orientation: the construct, research
propositions, and managerial implications. The Journal of Marketing, 1-18.
Kuratko, D. F., & Audretsch, D. B. (2013). Clarifying the domains of corporate
entrepreneurship. International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, 9(3),
323-335.
Kuratko, D. F., Covin, J. G., & Garrett, R. P. (2009). Corporate venturing: Insights from
actual performance. Business Horizons, 52(5), 459-467.
Kuratko, D. F., Covin, J. G., & Hornsby, J. S. (2014a). Why implementing corporate
innovation is so difficult. Business Horizons, 57(5), 647-655.
Kuratko, D. F., Hornsby, J. S., & Covin, J. G. (2014b). Diagnosing a firm's internal
environment for corporate entrepreneurship. Business Horizons, 57(1), 37-47.
Kuratko, D. F., Hornsby, J. S., & Goldsby, M. G. (2012). Innovation acceleration:
Transforming organizational thinking. (Upper Saddle River, Pearson/Prentice
Hall): NJ.
Kuratko, D. F., Hornsby, J. S., & Hayton, J. (2015). Corporate entrepreneurship: the
innovative challenge for a new global economic reality. Small Business
Economics, 45(2), 245-253.
Kuratko, D. F., Ireland, R. D., Covin, J. G., & Hornsby, J. S. (2005). A Model of Middle–
Level Managers’ Entrepreneurial Behavior. Entrepreneurship theory and
practice, 29(6), 699-716.
Lane, P. J., Koka, B. R., & Pathak, S. (2006). The reification of absorptive capacity: A
critical review and rejuvenation of the construct. Academy of management review,
31(4), 833-863.

71

Lenox, M., & King, A. (2004). Prospects for developing absorptive capacity through
internal information provision. Strategic Management Journal, 25(4), 331-345.
Lichtenthaler, U. (2009). Absorptive capacity, environmental turbulence, and the
complementarity of organizational learning processes. Academy of management
journal, 52(4), 822-846.
Lowen, A., & Pope, J. (2008). Survival analysis of international joint venture
relationships. The Journal of Business and Economic Studies, 14(1), 62.
Luo, Y., & Shenkar, O. (2011). Toward a perspective of cultural friction in international
business. Journal of International Management, 17(1), 1-14.
MacMillan, I. C., & George, R. (1985). Corporate venturing: Challenges for senior
managers. Journal of Business Strategy, 5(3), 34-43.
March, J. G. (1991). Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning.
Organization science, 2(1), 71-87.
McDougall, P. P. (1989). International versus domestic entrepreneurship: new venture
strategic behavior and industry structure. Journal of Business Venturing, 4(6),
387-400.
Mcgrath, R. G., Venkataraman, S., & MacMillan, I. C. (1994). The advantage chain:
Antecedents to rents from internal corporate ventures. Journal of business
venturing, 9(5), 351-369.
Miles, M. P., & Covin, J. G. (2002). Exploring the practice of corporate venturing: Some
common forms and their organizational implications. Entrepreneurship theory
and practice, 26(3), 21-40.

72

Morris, M. H., Kuratko, D. F., & Covin, J. G. (2010). Corporate entrepreneurship &
innovation. Cengage Learning.
Nell, P. C., & Ambos, B. (2013). Parenting advantage in the MNC: An embeddedness
perspective on the value added by headquarters. Strategic Management
Journal, 34(9), 1086-1103.
Nippa, M., Pidun, U., & Rubner, H. (2011). Corporate portfolio management: Appraising
four decades of academic research. Academy of Management Perspectives, 25(4),
50-66.
Oviatt, B. M., & McDougall, P. P. (1994). Toward a theory of international new ventures.
Journal of international business studies, 25(1), 45-64.
Raudenbush, S. W., & Bryk, A. S. (2002). Hierarchical linear models: Applications and
data analysis methods (Vol. 1). Sage.
Riley, D., Kalafatis, S., & Manoochehri, F. (2009). The impact of entrepreneurial
orientation and managerial resources on corporate venture outcomes.
International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management, 9(3),
242-266.
Sathe, V. (1985). Culture and related corporate realities: Text, cases, and readings on
organizational entry, establishment, and change. Richard D Irwin.
Schein, E. H. (1985). Organisational culture and leadership: A dynamic view. San
Francisco.
Schollhammer, H. (1982). Internal corporate entrepreneurship. Encyclopedia of
entrepreneurship, 209, 223.

73

Semadeni, M., Withers, M.C., Certo S.T. (2014). The perils of endogeneity and
instrumental variables in strategy research: Understanding through simulations.
Strategic Management Journal, 35(7), 1070-1079.
Shenkar, O. (2001). Cultural distance revisited: Towards a more rigorous
conceptualization and measurement of cultural differences. Journal of
international business studies, 32(3), 519-535.
Shenkar, O. (2012). Cultural distance revisited: Towards a more rigorous
conceptualization and measurement of cultural differences. Journal of
International Business Studies, 43(1), 1-11.
Shrader, R. C., & Simon, M. (1997). Corporate versus independent new ventures:
Resource, strategy, and performance differences. Journal of Business Venturing,
12(1), 47-66.
Sherman, S. 1992. Are strategic alliances working? Fortune, September 21: 77-78.
Simon, M., Houghton, S. M., & Gurney, J. (1999). Succeeding at internal corporate
venturing: roles needed to balance autonomy and control. Journal of Applied
Management Studies, 8(2), 145.
Song, M., Droge, C., Hanvanich, S., & Calantone, R. (2005). Marketing and technology
resource complementarity: An analysis of their interaction effect in two
environmental contexts. Strategic management journal, 26(3), 259-276.
Sorrentino, M., & Williams, M. L. (1995). Relatedness and corporate venturing: Does it
really matter?. Journal of Business Venturing, 10(1), 59-73.

74

Tallman, S. B., & Shenkar, O. (1994). A managerial decision model of international
cooperative venture formation. Journal of International Business Studies, 25(1),
91-113.
Tanriverdi, H., & Venkatraman, N. (2005). Knowledge relatedness and the performance
of multibusiness firms. Strategic management journal, 26(2), 97-119.
Thornhill, S., & Amit, R. (2001). A dynamic perspective of internal fit in corporate
venturing. Journal of business venturing, 16(1), 25-50.
Tseng, V., & Fuligni, A. J. (2000). Parent‐Adolescent language use and relationships
among immigrant families with East Asian, Filipino, and Latin American
backgrounds. Journal of Marriage and Family, 62(2), 465-476.
Von Hippel, E. (1977). The dominant role of the user in semiconductor and electronic
subassembly process innovation. IEEE Transactions on Engineering
Management, (2), 60-71.
Zahra, S. A., & George, G. (2002). Absorptive capacity: A review, reconceptualization,
and extension. Academy of management review, 27(2), 185-203.
Zahra, S. A., Ireland, R. D., & Hitt, M. A. (2000). International expansion by new
venture firms: International diversity, mode of market entry, technological
learning, and performance. Academy of Management journal, 43(5), 925-950.
Zollo, M., Reuer, J. J., & Singh, H. (2002). Interorganizational routines and performance
in strategic alliances. Organization science, 13(6), 701-713.

75

Appendix
Survey Items
Listing of the Internal Corporate Venturing Research Variables
Corporate Manager Information
Parent Corporation Information
Parent Corporation’s Internal Corporate Venturing Experience
Venture Manager Information-Venture Manager
Venture Background Information
1. Venture physical location
2. Venture operational status
3. Venture development stage
4. Venture type
5. Venture age
6. Venture size
7. Venture Structural positioning
Cultural Distance- Corporate Manager
Cultural Distance- Venture Manager
Venture Performance – Corporate Manager
Venture Performance – Venture Manager
Turbulence Scales-both managers
Absorptive Capacity Scales-both managers
Learning Extensiveness
Venture Origin-Related Considerations
1. Top management support.
Venture Autonomy
1. Venture planning autonomy.
2. Venture operations autonomy.
3. Venture operations independence.
Parent-Venture Similarity
1. Parent-venture market similarity.
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Operationalizations of the Internal Corporate Venturing Research Variables

Corporate Manager Information
1. What is your position title?
____________________________________________________________________
2. How long have you been in your current position? __________
3. In what year did you join the corporation? __________

Parent Corporation Information
1. What is the name of your corporation?
__________________________________________________________
2. What is the physical location of the corporation?
______________________________________________
3. What is the approximate total sales revenue of your corporation for the latest full fiscal year?
$__________
4. Approximately what percentage of your corporation’s total sales revenue is generated through
sales made in your corporation’s single largest industry? __________%
5. Approximately how many persons does your corporation employ? __________
6. Is your corporation publicly or privately owned (circle one)? Public Private
Parent Corporation’s Internal Corporate Venturing Experience
For purposes of the current research, an internal corporate venture is defined as an
entrepreneurial initiative that originated within the corporate structure (or within an existing
business of the corporation) and was intended from its inception as a new business for the
corporation, where a new business is represented by the shaded cells in the following figure.

Market Focus
of the Venture

Market Creation
(New to “World”)

New
Business

New
Business

New
Business

New
Business

New Market for
the Corp.

Major Market
Development

New
Business

New
Business

New
Business

Extension of
Current Market

Minor Market
Development

New
Business

New
Business

Current Market
of the Corp.

Market
Penetration

Minor ProductMarket
Development
Minor Product
Development

Major Product
Development

New
Business

Current Product
of the Corp.

Extension of
Current Product

New Product for
the Corp. in
Current Industry

New Product for
the Corp. in New
Industry (i.e.,
Diversification)

Product Focus of the Venture

Using the preceding definition of an internal corporate venture…
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1. Approximately how many distinct new internal corporate ventures has your corporation
financially invested in (i.e., provided some level of start-up funding to) over the past 7
years regardless of whether these ventures are currently operating or were terminated
somewhere along their development path? __________

2. How many internal ventures (7 years old or less) is your corporation currently pursuing
in each of the following stages?
Early stage venture (start-up funding provided to venture, but no sales revenue yet generated)
__________
Middle stage venture (generating some sales revenue, but no profit) __________
Established stage venture (generating some profit) __________

Venture Manager Information- Venture Manager
What is the name of your corporation?
______________________________________________________________
What is your current position title?
_________________________________________________________________
How long have you been employed by your corporation?
_______________________________________________
In any corporation, and including the identified venture …
1. With how many internal new ventures have you been personally and directly involved?
__________
2. For how many internal new ventures have you been the principal manager? __________

Venture Background Information
Where is the venture physically located__________________
Venture Operational Status – Whether the venture is currently operating or defunct.
Please indicate the operational status of the venture you’re describing.
_____ This venture is currently operating.
_____ This venture is defunct – it has been terminated or otherwise expired.

Venture Development Stage
Please indicate the development stage of the venture you’re describing.
_____ Early Stage Venture – These ventures have received financial investment from the
corporation or their sponsoring division, but are not yet generating any revenue. Alternatively,
for a defunct venture in this stage, it never generated any revenue and was terminated.
_____ Middle Stage Venture – These ventures are currently generating revenue, but are not yet
profitable. Alternatively, for a defunct venture in this stage, it generated revenue but never
generated any profit and was terminated.
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_____ Established Stage Venture – These ventures are currently generating some profit (total
estimated revenues exceed total estimated costs). Alternatively, for a defunct venture in this
stage, it generated some profit but was, nonetheless, terminated.
If you are describing a middle or established stage venture, please indicate the venture’s revenue
for its latest year of operation. (For a defunct venture, please indicate the revenue it generated in
the year of its expiry.) $_________________
Additionally, if you are describing an established stage venture, please indicate the venture’s
Return-on-Sales percentage (i.e., gross profit-to-sales ratio) for its latest year of operation. (For a
defunct venture, please indicate the Return-on-Sales percentage it generated in the year of its
expiry.) ________________%
Venture Type
Internal corporate ventures represent new businesses for the firm. Please place an “X” in the
shaded cell that best corresponds to the venture you’re describing in this survey.

Market Focus
of the Venture

Market Creation
(New to “World”)

New
Business

New
Business

New
Business

New
Business

New Market for
the Corp.

Major Market
Development

New
Business

New
Business

New
Business

Extension of
Current Market

Minor Market
Development

New
Business

New
Business

Current Market
of the Corp.

Market
Penetration

Minor ProductMarket
Development
Minor Product
Development

Major Product
Development

New
Business

Current Product
of the Corp.

Extension of
Current Product

New Product for
the Corp. in
Current Industry

New Product for
the Corp. in New
Industry (i.e.,
Diversification)

Product Focus of the Venture

Venture Age
For a currently operating venture… please indicate the age of the venture you’re describing,
using the time at which initial start-up funding was provided to the venture as its founding date.
__________ years
For a defunct venture… please indicate the age of the venture at the time of its expiration, using
the time at which initial start-up funding was provided to the venture as its founding date.
__________ years
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Venture Size
How many persons are currently assigned to the venture (or were at the time of a defunct
venture’s expiration) on a full-time basis? __________
…on a part-time basis?
__________
Venture Structural Positioning – Where the venture is located in an organizational structure sense
within the parent corporation.
Please indicate how the venture is (was) positioned within your corporate structure by circling the
appropriate response to each question.
1. Does (did) the venture exist within a pre-existing,
established business of the corporation?
2. Does (did) the venture exist within a dedicated new ventures unit?

Yes

No

Yes

No

Cultural Distance Instrument- Venture Manager
The following items relate to the BELIEFS AND ASSUMPTIONS that top management
of the parent corporation and its corporate venture have about the IMPORTANCE of some
business practices and procedures, and how things should be done for the success of a
business. This instrument is divided into three columns in the first column the practice or
procedure you are being asked to respond about is listed.

In the second column you are asked to indicate your level of agreement with: “This practice
or procedure is one that management of my company believes or assumes is very important
for the business to succeed.” Please, circle for each item the most appropriate answer: a
score of "1" means that you strongly DISAGREE with the statement, while a score of "7"
means that you strongly AGREE.

In the third column you are asked to indicate your perceptions about the extent to which
the importance of the following items is DIFFERENT for the top management group of
your company VERSUS the top management group of the parent corporation. Please, circle
for each item the most appropriate answer: a score of "1" means that the two top
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management groups are very SIMILAR, while a score of "7" means that they are very
DIFFERENT.
Item

Is the item important to your
company?

How different is the
importance of the item to your
company and the parent
corporation?
Very
Very
Similar
Different

Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
1. Managers should share
information and communicate
with other subunit of the
company
2. Managers should quickly
respond to changes in the
business environment
3. In the long run managers can
get ahead fastest by playing it
safe, sure, and slow
4. Compensation for managers
should be competitive with
similar companies
5. Measures used to judge
managerial performance should
be clear
6. Top management should
provide support and warmth to
those managers below them
7. High autonomy in decision
making should be given to
managers
8. Managers should recognize
and seize good opportunities as
they arise
9. Managers should take
chances on good ideas
10. Rewards and recognition
should be based on a manager’s
performance
11. There should be
continuous pressure to
improve personal and group
performance
12. Formal authority for
decision making should be
made clear to all employees
13. Managers should maintain
and/or develop
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interrelationships with
managers of other departments
14. Managers should be
encouraged to be innovative,
take independent actions, and
reasonable risks
Item

1
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7

Is the item important to your
company?
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7

How different is the
importance of the item to your
company and the parent
corporation?
Very
Very
Similar
Different

Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
15. Managers should be
encouraged to air conflicts and
constructive criticism openly
16. Formal rules and
procedures should be followed
in making and carrying out all
activities
17. Managers should be
innovative rather than
conservative in decision
making
18. Managerial promotions
should be highly associated
with excellence in performing
the job
19. Managers should be free to
make independent decisions
20. Calculated risks should be
taken at the right time
21. Decision-making should be
timely
22. Goals should be
venturesome
23. Various subunit managers
should make efforts to
understand each other’s
problems and difficulties
24. Managers should be held
personally accountable for the
end results they produce
25. To be effective, decision
makers should be very cautious
26. Responsibility for decisions
should be clearly
communicated to all managers
27. Managers should create and
maintain effective
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communication and
cooperation with peers
28. Managers should be
encouraged to expose conflicts
and to seek ways to resolve
them
29. Promotion of managers
should be based on
competence as reflected by
their performance
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Cultural Distance Instrument- Corporate Manager
The following items relate to the BELIEFS AND ASSUMPTIONS that top management
of the parent corporation and its corporate venture have about the IMPORTANCE of some
business practices and procedures, and how things should be done for the success of a
business. This instrument is divided into three columns in the first column the practice or
procedure you are being asked to respond about is listed.

In the second column you are asked to indicate your level of agreement with: “This practice
or procedure is one that management of my company believes or assumes is very important
for the business to succeed.” Please, circle for each item the most appropriate answer: a
score of "1" means that you strongly DISAGREE with the statement, while a score of "7"
means that you strongly AGREE.

In the third column you are asked to indicate your perceptions about the extent to which
the importance of the following items is DIFFERENT for the top management group of
your company VERSUS the top management group of the venture. Please, circle for each
item the most appropriate answer: a score of "1" means that the two top management
groups are very SIMILAR, while a score of "7" means that they are very DIFFERENT.
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Item

Is the item important to your
company?

How different is the
importance of the item to your
company and the venture?
Very
Very
Similar
Different

Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
1. Managers should share
information and communicate
with other subunit of the
company
2. Managers should quickly
respond to changes in the
business environment
3. In the long run managers can
get ahead fastest by playing it
safe, sure, and slow
4. Compensation for managers
should be competitive with
similar companies
5. Measures used to judge
managerial performance should
be clear
6. Top management should
provide support and warmth to
those managers below them
7. High autonomy in decision
making should be given to
managers
8. Managers should recognize
and seize good opportunities as
they arise
9. Managers should take
chances on good ideas
10. Rewards and recognition
should be based on a manager’s
performance
11. There should be continuous
pressure to improve personal
and group performance
12. Formal authority for
decision making should be
made clear to all employees
13. Managers should maintain
and/or develop
interrelationships with
managers of other departments
14. Managers should be
encouraged to be innovative,
take independent actions, and
reasonable risks
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Item

Is the item important to your
company?

How different is the
importance of the item to your
company and the venture?
Very
Very
Similar
Different

Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
15. Managers should be
encouraged to air conflicts and
constructive criticism openly
16. Formal rules and
procedures should be followed
in making and carrying out all
activities
17. Managers should be
innovative rather than
conservative in decision
making
18. Managerial promotions
should be highly associated
with excellence in performing
the job
19. Managers should be free to
make independent decisions
20. Calculated risks should be
taken at the right time
21. Decision-making should be
timely
22. Goals should be
venturesome
23. Various subunit managers
should make efforts to
understand each other’s
problems and difficulties
24. Managers should be held
personally accountable for the
end results they produce
25. To be effective, decision
makers should be very cautious
26. Responsibility for decisions
should be clearly
communicated to all managers
27. Managers should create and
maintain effective
communication and
cooperation with peers
28. Managers should be
encouraged to expose conflicts
and to seek ways to resolve
them

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7
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29. Promotion of managers
should be based on
competence as reflected by
their performance

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

Venture Performance – Corporate Manager
Please respond to the statements below in reference to the venture in question. Because
defunct ventures will have performed variously well prior to their expiration/termination,
I am asking you to complete the following scale even if the venture in question is no
longer operating. If the venture is defunct, please indicate how you would have evaluated
the venture at the time of its expiration/termination. Indicate your level of agreement (by
circling the appropriate number) with each statement based on the following scale:
Strongly
Slightly
Slightly
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Disagree Neutral
Agree
Agree
Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
1.) This venture generally meets (or met) the
expectations of the parent corporation

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2.) The parent corporation views (or viewed) this
venture as being successful, overall

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3.) The parent corporation believes (or believed) that
1 2 3 4 5
this venture achieved its key milestones (i.e., events crucial to the venture’s
successful development) on schedule for each stage of its development

6

7

4.) The venture is performing (or performed) well in
1 2 3 4
5 6
terms of the criteria (e.g., financial returns, market share, learning/
acquisition of new knowledge) the parent corporation considers (or considered)
important to the venture’s success.

7

Venture Performance – Venture Manager
Please respond to the statements below in reference to the venture in question. Because
defunct ventures will have performed variously well prior to their expiration/termination,
I am asking you to complete the following scale even if the venture in question is no
longer operating. If the venture is defunct, please indicate how you would have evaluated
the venture at the time of its expiration/termination. Indicate your level of agreement (by
circling the appropriate number) with each statement based on the following scale:
Strongly
Slightly
Slightly
Strongly
86

Disagree Disagree Disagree
1
2
3

Neutral
4

Agree
Agree
5
6
Strongly

Agree
7

Strongly
Disagree
Agree
1.) This venture generally meets (or met) the
expectations of its managers

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2.) The venture managers view (or viewed) this
venture as being successful, overall

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3.) The venture managers believe (or believed) that
1 2 3 4 5
this venture achieved its key milestones (i.e., events crucial to the venture’s
successful development) on schedule for each stage of its development

6

7

4.) The venture is performing (or performed) well in
1 2 3 4
5 6
terms of the criteria (e.g., financial returns, market share, learning/
acquisition of new knowledge) the venture managers consider (or considered)
important to the venture’s success.

7

Turbulence Scales
The following items relate to the BELIEFS AND ASSUMPTIONS that top management within
your corporation has about the turbulences and competition that your corporation faces. Please,
circle for each item the most appropriate answer: a score of "1" means that you strongly disagree
with the statement, while a score of “7" means that you strongly agree.

Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
Market Turbulence
1.) In our kind of business, customers’ product
preferences change quite a bit over time

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2.) Our customers tend to look for new product all
the time

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3.) We are witnessing demand for our products and services 1
from customers who never bought them before

2

3

4

5

6

7

4.) New customers tend to have product-related needs that

2

3

4

5

6

7
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1

are different from those of our existing customers
5.) We cater to many of the same customers that
we used to in the past

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1.) Competition in our industry is cutthroat

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2.) There are many “promotion wars” in our industry

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3.) Anything that one competitor can offer, others can
match readily

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4.) Price competition is a hallmark of our industry

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5.) One hears of a new competitive move almost every day

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6.) Our competitors are relatively weak

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Competitive Intensity

Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
Technological Turbulence
1.) The technology in our industry is changing rapidly

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2.) Technological changes provide big opportunities in
our industry

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3.) A large number of new product ideas have been made
1
possible through technological breakthroughs in our industry

2

3

4

5

6

7

4.) Technological developments in our industry are
rather minor

2

3

4

5

6

7
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1

Absorptive Capacity Scales

The following items relate to the learning activities that your company engages in. Please,
circle for each item the most appropriate answer: a score of "1" means that you strongly
disagree with the statement, while a score of “7" means that you strongly agree.
Absorptive Capacity Scales
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
Exploratory Learning-Recognize
1.) We frequently scan the environment for new
technologies

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2.) We thoroughly observe technological trends

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3.) We observe in detail external sources of new
technologies

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4.) We thoroughly collect industry information

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5.) We have information on the state-of-the-art of
external technologies

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1.) We frequently acquire technologies from external
sources

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2.) We periodically organize special meetings with
external partners to acquire new technologies

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3.) Employees regularly approach external institutions
to acquire technological knowledge

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4.) We often transfer technological knowledge to our firm
in response to technology acquisition opportunities

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Exploratory Learning-Assimilate

Transformative Learning-Maintain
1.) We thoroughly maintain relevant knowledge over time
89

2.) Employees store technological knowledge for future
reference

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3.) We communicate relevant knowledge across the units
of our firm

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4.) Knowledge management is functioning well in our
company

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
Transformative Learning-Reactivate
1.) When recognizing a business opportunity, we can
quickly rely on our existing knowledge

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2.) We are proficient in reactivating existing
knowledge for new uses

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3.) We quickly analyze and interpret changing market
demands for our technologies

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4.) New opportunities to serve our customers with existing
technologies are quickly understood

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1.) We are proficient in transforming technological
knowledge into new products

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2.) We regularly match new technologies with ideas
for new products

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3.) We quickly recognize the usefulness of new
technological knowledge for existing knowledge

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4.) Our employees are capable of sharing their expertise
to develop new products

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Exploitative Learning-Transmute

Exploitative Learning-Apply
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1.) We regularly apply technologies in new products

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2.) We constantly consider how to better exploit
technologies

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3.) We easily implement technologies in new products

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4.) It is well known who can best exploit new
technologies inside our firm

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Learning Extensiveness
Knowledge Acquisition Extensiveness – The extent to which management’s knowledge pertaining
to various aspects of operations has increased over the course of the venture’s development.
Please indicate on the following scale (by circling the appropriate number) the extent to which
management’s knowledge in the following areas increased over the course of the venture’s
development? For a venture that is no longer operating, consider knowledge gains from the time
of the venture’s inception to its expiration.
What we know about

What we know about

What we know

this matter has
moderately increased

this matter has
dramatically

since the venture was

since the venture

about
this matter has
not increased
increased
since the venture was
was
initially approved
1
2

3

initially approved
4

5

Knowledge pertaining to…
1. the determinants of demand in our targeted market.
2. important attributes of product and/or service offerings.
3. competitive dynamics in our industry.
4. important qualities of a viable competitive strategy.
5. important characteristics of the internal operations (i.e., structure and
process considerations).
6. characteristics of an effective business model.
7. the types of assets/resources needed to excel competitively.
8. how to best structure relationships between a venture
and a parent corporation.
9. how to communicate effectively with others.
10. new ideas about how to perform my job.
11. new skills to improve the way I perform my job.

1
1
1
1
1

6

initially approved
7

2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5

6
6
6
6
6

7
7
7
7
7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Venture Origin-Related Considerations
IMPORTANT NOTE TO SURVEY RESPONDENT: When a survey item mentions a verb in
both the present and past tense – for example, the next survey item reads “The venture has
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(had) the strong support of the parent corporation’s senior-level management.” – the past tense
wording of the item is meant to apply solely to ventures that are defunct.
Top Management Support – The extent to which the parent company’s senior-level management
is supportive of the venture.
Please indicate your level of agreement (by circling the appropriate number) with each of the
following statements based on the following scale:
Strongly
Slightly
Slightly
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Agree
Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1. The venture has (had) the strong support of
the parent corporation’s senior-level management.
2. The venture has (had) a committed champion/advocate
within the parent corporation’s top management ranks.
3. The parent corporation’s senior-level management has (had)
openly expressed verbal commitments to the venture’s success.
4. Actions and resource allocations of the parent company’s
senior-level management are (were) clearly supportive of the venture.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Venture Autonomy
Venture Planning Autonomy – The extent to which the venture’s management team (vs. corporate
parent management) is responsible for establishing goals, timetables, event milestones, and
strategy for the venture.
Please indicate (by circling the appropriate number) your response to the following question
based on the following scale.
Equally the responsibility
The sole
responsibility
The sole responsibility
of a higher level(s) of authority
of venture-level
management
of a higher level(s) of authority
within the corporation and
venture-level within the corporation
venture-level management
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Who is (was) responsible for each of the following venture activities and decision areas?
1. Setting of the venture’s goals.
1 2 3 4 5 6
2. Establishment of a timetable (if applicable) for the
1 2 3 4 5 6
achievement of the venture’s goals.
3. Choice of formal criteria used to measure the venture’s performance. 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. Identification of event milestones (if any) used to
1 2 3 4 5 6
assess the venture’s progress.
5. Formulation of the venture’s business strategy.
1 2 3 4 5 6
6. Decision to change (if necessary) the venture’s business strategy.
1 2 3 4 5 6

7
7
7
7
7
7

Venture Operations Autonomy – The extent to which the venture’s management team (vs.
corporate parent management) is responsible for the design of the venture’s internal operations.
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Please indicate (by circling the appropriate number) your response to the following question
based on the following scale.
Equally the responsibility
The sole
responsibility
The sole responsibility
of a higher level(s) of authority
of venture-level
management
of a higher level(s) of authority
within the corporation and
venture-level within the corporation
venture-level management
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Who is (was) responsible for each of the following venture activities and decision areas?
1. The venture’s operating and decision policies.
1 2 3 4 5 6
2. The venture’s administrative/organizational structure.
1 2 3 4 5 6
3. The venture’s communications and reporting relationships.
1 2 3 4 5 6
4. The venture’s workflow and operating processes.
1 2 3 4 5 6
5. The venture’s standard operating procedures.
1 2 3 4 5 6
6. The venture’s overall business model.
1 2 3 4 5 6

7
7
7
7
7
7

Venture Operations Independence – The extent to which the venture’s operations are linked to
those of other businesses of the corporation.
Please indicate your level of agreement (by circling the appropriate number) with each of the
following statements based on the following scale:
Strongly
Slightly
Slightly
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Agree
Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1. The venture operates (operated) as a self-contained business unit,
with few or weak structural or process linkages with other
businesses of the corporation.
2. The venture’s operations are (were) not significantly constrained
or dictated by formal structural or process linkages with
other businesses of the corporation.
3. The venture operates (operated) in an independent manner
vis-à-vis other businesses of the corporation.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Parent-Venture Similarity
Parent-Venture Market Similarity – The extent to which the venture is similar to other businesses
of the corporation in terms of markets served.
Please indicate your level of agreement (by circling the appropriate number) with each of the
following statements based on the following scale:
Strongly
Slightly
Slightly
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Agree
Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1. The venture’s actual or proposed customer market is (was)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7

already served by another business of the corporation.
2. The venture’s actual or proposed customer market is (was)
highly similar or strongly related to one already served by
another business of the corporation.
3. The venture’s actual or proposed customer market is (was)
well known to the corporation based on past sales from
other businesses of the corporation.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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